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Abstract 
Since the 1980s, important and progressive reforms have profoundly reshaped the structure 
of the Chinese banking system. Many empirical studies suggest that financial reform 
promoted bank competition in most mature and emerging economies. However, some 
earlier studies that adopted conventional approaches to measure competition concluded 
that bank competition in China declined during the past decade, despite these reforms. In 
this paper, we show both empirically and theoretically that this apparent contradiction is the 
result of flawed measurement. Conventional indicators such as the Lerner index and Panzar-
Rosse H-statistic fail to measure competition in Chinese loan markets properly due to the 
system of interest rate regulation. By contrast, the relatively new Profit Elasticity (PE) 
approach that was introduced in Boone (2008) as Relative Profit Differences (RPD) does not 
evidence these shortcomings. Using balance sheet information for a large sample of banks 
operating in China during 1996-2008, we show that competition actually increased in the 
past decade when the PE indicator is used. We provide additional empirical evidence that 
supports our results. We find that these, firstly, are in line with the process of financial reform, 
as measured by several indices, and secondly are robust for a large number of alternative 
specifications and estimation methods. All in all, our analysis suggests that bank lending 
markets in China have been more competitive than previously assumed.  
JEL classification: D4, G21, L1. 
Keywords: competition, banking industry, China, lending markets, marginal costs, regulation, 
deregulation.  
 
 
 
Resumen 
Desde los años ochenta, la estructura del sistema bancario chino se ha visto reconfigurada a 
través de importantes reformas progresivas. Muchos estudios empíricos sugieren que la 
reforma financiera ha fomentado la competencia bancaria en la mayor parte de las 
economías avanzadas y emergentes. No obstante, algunos estudios previos que adoptaron 
enfoques convencionales para medir la competencia concluyeron que la competitividad 
bancaria en China descendió durante la década pasada, a pesar de estas reformas. En el 
presente análisis se muestra de forma teórica y empírica que esta aparente contradicción se 
debe a una medición errónea. Diversos indicadores convencionales —como el índice Lerner y 
el estadístico-H de Panzar-Rosse— no logran medir apropiadamente la competencia en los 
mercados de préstamo chinos, debido al sistema de regulación de los tipos de interés. Por el 
contrario, el enfoque relativamente novedoso de la elasticidad del beneficio (Profit Elasticity, 
PE) introducido por Boone (2008) a través de diferencias relativas en los beneficios (Relative 
Profit Differences, RPD) no sufre estas deficiencias. Mediante la utilización de información 
procedente de los balances de una gran muestra de bancos operativos en China durante 
1996-2008 se muestra que, en realidad, la competencia se ha visto incrementada durante la 
pasada década, cuando se emplea el indicador PE. Se proporciona una evidencia empírica 
adicional que apoya nuestros resultados. En primer lugar, se confirma que estos se 
encuentran alineados con el proceso de reforma financiera, medido según diversos índices; 
y, en segundo lugar, que son robustos en un gran número de especificaciones alternativas y 
métodos de estimación. En términos generales, nuestro análisis sugiere que los mercados de 
préstamos bancarios en China han sido más competitivos de lo que se asumía en la 
literatura. 
Códigos JEL: D4, G21, L1. 
Palabras clave: competencia, sector bancario, China, mercados de crédito, costes marginales, 
regulación, desregulación.  
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, the Chinese banking sector has become the focus of a growing body of 
empirical literature. Studies have tried to measure developments in bank efficiency and bank 
productivity, the contribution of bank intermediation to China’s economic growth and 
particular characteristics of Chinese banks’ corporate governance structures. 
Notwithstanding this progress in empirical research, relatively few econometrical analyses 
have concentrated explicitly on bank competition in China. 
The apparent lack of these studies is somewhat surprising, for a number of reasons. 
First, although different views persist, several established observers have identified 
competition as one of the key factors in China’s economic reform success. They argue that 
the expansion of incentives, mobility and markets has created unprecedented business 
opportunities, exemplified in astonishingly high scales of entry and exit. This process has 
pushed China’s economy towards “extraordinarily high levels of competition”, leading to a 
situation where “intense competition now pervades everyday economic life” (Brandt and 
Rawski, 2008).1 These claims make one wonder whether this general picture can be 
extended to a specific sector such as banking as well.   
Second, with China becoming one of the major global economic powers, overtaking 
Japan as the world’s second-biggest economy at the end of 2010, also Chinese banks have 
become global powerhouses. The “Big Four” state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) are 
now among the ten largest banks in the world according to market capitalisation, and China’s 
banks accounted for 20% of global banking profits in 2010 (KPMG, 2011; Löchel and Li, 
2011). They have embarked upon a global expansion strategy, opening new branches and 
subsidiaries abroad and forming cross-border alliances in bank services, while also 
developing internationally more diversified business lines in insurance and asset management. 
These global business advances originate from domestic market conditions, including certain 
degrees of efficiency, contestability and competition, providing additional arguments for 
investigating the latter. 
Third, the process of financial reform has reshaped China’s banking sector 
profoundly. The prevailing view is that after 30 years of financial reform, China’s banks have 
begun to behave more like commercial banks in the developed world (Firth et al., 2009). 
During this period, the banking landscape in China has changed dramatically. In essence, it 
moved from a socialist monolithic structure to a pluralistic system comprising various groups 
of market-oriented banks. The latter development started with the creation of a “two-tier” 
banking sector in 1978 with the establishment of the People’s Bank of China (PBC) as the 
central bank and four large state-owned specialised banks serving specific sectors of the 
economy. It took 16 years before the Chinese government started a new major round of 
reforms, when in 1994 three specialised policy banks were established to take over the policy 
loans from the “Big Four” banks and the status of the latter was changed to state-owned 
commercial banks. The conditions for China’s WTO accession and its actual entry into this 
organisation in 2001 triggered a major third round of reforms, including the establishment of 
an independent bank supervisor (China Banking Regulatory Commission or CBRC) and 
                                                                          
1. This despite China being a clear counter-example with respect to the conclusions from the existing literature on law, 
institutions, finance and growth on the advocated institutional framework conducive to economic development (Allen et 
al., 2005). 
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further measures regarding the liberalisation of interest rates, business scope and market 
entry. Overall, while acknowledging remaining deficiencies, the Chinese banking sector has 
moved gradually but unmistakably towards a commercially oriented market-type system, in 
which competitive forces should take on much greater significance.  
Last but certainly not least, investigation of bank competition in China contributes to 
the continuing debate on which empirical approaches may be the most suitable for measuring 
competition in specific banking systems. This argument has assumed growing weight in the 
bank competition literature, underpinning the rather unsatisfactory observation that the 
currently available empirical toolkit frequently yields contradictory and inconclusive results for 
specific countries and/or regions. For example, one study concludes that “well-known 
indicators of bank competition often give conflicting predictions of competitive behaviour 
across countries, within countries, and over time” and that the “determination of competition 
may differ depending on the measure chosen to assess it” (Carbó Valverde et al., 2009, p. 
132). These findings suggest that it may be preferable to consider different measures when 
assessing bank competition.  
This paper contributes to the literature on both Chinese banking and bank competition 
by arguing that conventional measures of competition like the Lerner index and the Panzar-
Rosse H-statistic may not assess bank competition in China correctly, mainly due to the 
existence of interest rate regulations. The former uses the profit or price cost margin (PCM), ie 
the mark-up in output prices above marginal cost, as an indicator of market power. The latter 
measures to what extent input and output prices move in step (as they would under perfect 
competition) or out of step (indicating monopoly or a perfect cartel) (Bikker, 2010). The 
shortcomings of these approaches in the context of Chinese banking markets can be 
summarised as follows. First, the Lerner index and Panzar-Rosse H-statistic may bias the results 
due to the system of interest rate regulation in China. Second, several other characteristics of 
Chinese banking make these conventional measures less appropriate as well, in our view.  
Instead, we argue that the relatively new Profit Elasticity (PE) indicator may be better 
suited to investigate competitive conditions in Chinese loan markets, given the particularities 
of the banking industry in China. This indicator, whose theoretical base is the Relative Profit 
Differences (RPD) concept, is based on the idea that competition rewards efficiency (Boone et 
al., 2007; Boone, 2008; Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011 and 2013). In general, an efficient firm 
will realise higher profits than a less efficient one. Crucial for the PE indicator is that this effect 
will be stronger the more competitive the market is.2 This can be explained as follows. In the 
theoretical setup of RPD, competition increases due to increased interaction between banks 
or due to lower entry costs. Boone (2008) shows that RPD is an increasing function of the 
degree of interaction between firms and a decreasing function of entry costs. Hence, RPD 
increases when competition intensifies, ie stronger competition decreases (increases) profits 
of more efficient firms by smaller (larger) amounts than for less efficient firms. The underlying 
intuition is that in a more competitive market, firms are punished more harshly (in terms of 
profits) for being inefficient. All in all, the PE indicator is a new measure of competition that is 
more robust from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view when compared with more 
conventional measures (Boone et al., 2007). Early empirical applications of the PE indicator 
are Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007), Van Leuvensteijn (2008) and Bikker and Van Leuvensteijn 
(2008), while a more explicit empirical validation has been provided by Boone and Van 
Leuvensteijn (2010). 
                                                                          
2. As with all measures of competition, the PE indicator is also based on certain assumptions, such as that of product 
homogeneity (product innovation does not matter). These assumptions will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.2. 
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The paper contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. It combines, 
according to our knowledge, for the first time the Lerner, Panzar-Rosse and PE approaches 
in one paper.3 We also demonstrate theoretically that RPD, from which the PE indicator is 
derived, is much better suited to assess competition in banking markets where interest rates 
are regulated, whereas in that case the Lerner index yields biased results. Furthermore, we 
assess the relationship of the various approaches with the process of financial reform. All in 
all, the paper provides an extensive discussion of the appropriateness of competition 
indicators for a specific country, in this case China, and argues that banking system specifics 
may significantly affect the results of different indicators of competition. Hence, we warn 
against “auto-pilot” applications of empirical measures to assess banking competition across 
countries. Moreover, the paper yields important new results regarding the development of 
competition in Chinese loan markets.    
These results can be summarised as follows. First, the conventional measures – both 
the Lerner index and the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic – show declining competition over time in 
Chinese loan markets. This despite the comprehensive process of financial reform, which 
according to a large body of empirical research promoted banking competition in many 
mature and other emerging market economies. The results for both indicators hold for 
alternative specifications, suggesting that they in themselves are estimated correctly. Second, 
we find that the long-run equilibrium assumption on which the H-statistic depends is violated, 
also for alternative specifications. This may be related to the financial reform process which 
continues to reshape the banking landscape in China profoundly. Hence, inferring competitive 
conditions from it for China is likely to give rise to bias (apart from in our view fundamental 
biases inherent in the Panzar-Rosse model with respect to China). Third, in contrast, the 
findings for the PE indicator show improving competition in Chinese loan markets over time, 
especially after 2001, with some retreat in the final years of our sample. Moreover, we are 
fairly able to explain the specific pattern of the development of competition. Fourth, our results 
for the PE indicator are in line with the development of various indicators of financial reform. 
Finally, the findings for the PE indicator are robust for several alternative specifications and 
pass various robustness tests. All in all, we see our a priori theoretical objections to the Lerner 
index and Panzar-Rosse H-statistic as appropriate measures to assess Chinese banking 
competition validated by the empirical results. The results support our belief that the PE 
indicator is better suited for this purpose. Overall, we contribute to both the ongoing 
discussion in the banking competition literature on the appropriateness of different 
competition measures and the growing empirical body of research on Chinese banking. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
overview of the research literature on empirical measures of bank competition. Section 3 first 
gives background information on the structure of Chinese banking (3.1), followed by a review 
of China-specific studies on bank efficiency and competition (3.2). Section 4 presents the 
methodological framework of the standard and elasticity-adjusted Lerner indices (4.1) and the 
PE indicator (4.2). Moreover, it demonstrates that the Lerner index yields biased results under 
binding interest rate regulation and RPD not (4.3). Section 5 shows our data and sample 
characteristics. Section 6 presents the empirical results for the (elasticity-adjusted) Lerner 
index (6.1) and the PE indicator (6.2). It then compares the results of the various empirical 
measures (6.3) and presents a detailed interpretation of the results from the PE indicator, 
including their relationship with various financial reform indicators (6.4). Section 7 concludes. 
                                                                          
3. The Panzar-Rosse H-statistic is presented in Appendix A. 
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2 Review of empirical literature on bank competition 
 
Competition in the banking sector has generally been analysed on the basis of two 
concepts, ie market power and efficiency, which have sometimes been tested jointly. Here, 
market power reflects the ability of specific banks to control the market for bank products, 
whereas efficiency relates to the ability of specific banks to produce output (such as loans) 
at minimal cost. 
With respect to the first concept for investigating bank competition, a well-known 
approach to measuring market power is suggested by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). 
These authors analyse bank behaviour on an aggregate level and estimate the market power 
of an average bank following a specific short-run model. Empirical studies based on this 
approach are rather scarce though, as it is very data-intensive. Another approach based on 
market power has been proposed by Panzar and Rosse (1987), which is the so-called “H-
statistic” and which will be discussed in greater detail in Appendix A. The specific value of the 
“H-statistic” measure indicates how competitive the market is, ranging from a monopoly (or 
perfect collusion) to a situation of perfect competition. A third indicator for market power is 
the “Hirschman-Herfindahl Index” (HHI), which measures the degree of market concentration. 
This indicator is often used in the context of the “Structure Conduct Performance” (SCP) 
model, which assumes that market structure affects banks’ behaviour, which in turn 
determines their performance. The idea is that a highly concentrated banking sector (with a 
few banks occupying significant market shares) can impair competition, in the sense that 
concentration translates into greater market power, resulting in collusive behaviour and 
excess profits for banks. Finally, market power may also be related to profits, in the sense 
that extremely high profits may be indicative of a lack of competition. A traditional measure of 
profitability is the price-cost margin (PCM), which is equal to the output price minus the 
marginal costs. The PCM is frequently used in the empirical industrial organisation literature as 
an empirical approximation of the Lerner index (see Section 4.1) and in this context applied to 
the banking sector as well.  
With respect to the second concept for measuring bank competition, ie efficiency, 
this indicator is often seen as a proxy for competition, in the sense that the most efficient 
banks (and therefore the most competitive ones) will gain market share at the cost of the less 
efficient banks. A relatively recent method, which has been named the profit elasticity (PE) 
model or the “Boone” indicator, can be seen as an elaboration on this efficiency hypothesis. 
This measure has gained considerable support more recently (Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2007, 
2011 and 2013; Van Leuvensteijn, 2008; Schaeck and Cihák, 2010; Delis, 2012; Tabak et al., 
2012). The underlying model will be explained in more detail in Section 4.2.  
The actual literature on the measurement of competition is generally categorised into 
two major streams (Bikker, 2004; Tabak et al., 2012). So-called structural approaches are 
based on the SCP model and use concentration indicators as proxies for competition, such 
as the HHI and the CRn which measures the market shares of the n largest banks. In 
contrast, non-structural approaches have been promoted within the so-called New Empirical 
Industrial Organisation (NEIO) literature. They estimate parameters that reflect the degree of 
competition in specific markets based on bank-level data and specific assumptions on the 
behaviour of banks. The Bresnahan, Lau and Panzar-Rosse approaches mentioned above, 
as well as the Lerner index and PE elasticity, fall into this part of the literature. While these 
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measures have been broadly accepted, there is no consensus regarding which is the “best” 
indicator for gauging bank competition (Carbó Valverde et al., 2009). As a matter of fact, they 
often reach different conclusions for banking systems of the same countries and groups of 
countries. Consequently, leading experts in the field acknowledge that the ability of empirical 
research to capture the degree of bank competition is still imperfect and that developing 
proper competitiveness tests and methodologies will remain an important area of research 
(Claessens, 2009, p. 95; Claessens and Laeven, 2004, p. 581).  
At the same time, a view that has been gaining support is that concentration may 
not be the most appropriate indicator for measuring bank competition (Bikker, 2004; Casu 
and Girardone, 2006 and 2009; Schaeck et al., 2009). Moreover, concentration does not 
measure the competitive conduct of banks at the margin. In addition, concentration indices 
such as the HHI do not distinguish between small and large countries and may incorrectly 
suggest that competition is declining, while in fact concentration and competition are 
increasing simultaneously as a result of bank consolidation (Van Leuvensteijn, 2008; Van 
Leuvensteijn et al., 2013).     
One of the main issues that has been at the core of empirical studies on bank 
competition, and which may be especially relevant for China, is the impact of financial reform 
on the degree of competitiveness of banking systems and subsequent efficiency and welfare 
gains. There is considerable empirical evidence that deregulation fostered competitive 
conditions in banking markets and led to greater product differentiation, lower cost of and 
improved access to financial services and greater financial stability (Claessens, 2009). These 
effects have been validated empirically especially for the United States and emerging market 
economies, while results have been less conclusive for Europe. 
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3 Background on Chinese banking 
3.1 The structure of the Chinese banking industry4 
China’s financial system has undergone a comprehensive process of reform during the past 
30 years, of which one of the main objectives was to improve competition and efficiency in 
the banking sector.5 In this section, we provide an overview of developments which are of 
particular relevance for the investigation of competition in Chinese loan markets. These are 
the start of commercial banking in China, the entrance of new players, which was promoted 
by China joining the WTO in 2001, and the deregulation of the credit control system and of 
interest rates. 
The Commercial Bank Law of the People’s Republic of China was promulgated in 
May 1995, which paved the way for the development of a commercial banking system in 
China and the entrance of important new players (Fu and Heffernan, 2009). In this context, 
12 so-called joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) and more than 100 city commercial 
banks (CCBs) were established. The former initially offered banking services only regionally, 
but later they were allowed to operate freely nationwide, competing with the state-owned 
commercial banks (SOCBs) for the large firms and with the CCBs for small and medium-
sized enterprises. CCBs offer commercial banking services to small and medium-sized 
enterprises and households in the main cities or in certain provinces, but have been 
expanding to larger companies that would normally do business with the SOCBs and 
JSCBs. The requirement for CCBs to operate only within the cities’ own administrative 
districts was lifted from 2007 onwards, allowing them to compete in larger geographical 
areas (Sun and Yamori, 2011). 
The commercialisation of Chinese banking was triggered by mounting problems at 
the four state-owned specialised banks which concentrated on providing loans to state-
owned enterprises in specific sectors. These “Big Four” (Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of 
China, China Construction Bank, and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China) experienced 
a significant deterioration of their asset quality in the early 1990s. This was reflected in a rapid 
increase of their non-performing loans, which consisted predominantly of loans to state-
owned enterprises, granted mainly for political instead of business reasons. Three specialised 
policy banks were established to take over the policy-lending business of the “Big Four” 
banks. The latter were converted into state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), and four 
asset management companies were given the task of absorbing their non-performing loans. 
Hence, since the mid-1990s, three main groups of Chinese commercial banks – SOCBs, 
JSCBs and CCBs – have become active in Chinese loan markets. Arguably, this expansion of 
the number of providers of credit may have promoted competitive conditions in these 
markets. In fact, as is shown in Table 1, the market share of the SOCBs has declined 
significantly. While their average annual market shares of total assets and loans during 1996-
2001 were 86% and 88%, respectively, these shares dropped to 72% and 71%, respectively, 
                                                                          
4. This section will only pay attention to the major banks which are covered in our study and ignore smaller banks such 
as rural credit co-operatives. In the same vein, only those aspects of financial reform that are related to the banks in our 
sample will be discussed.  
5. According to the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), financial reform in China can be classified in three 
major stages (1978-1993, 1994-2002, 2003-present), which are discussed extensively in Liu (2009). Clear overviews in 
English are presented in, for example, Matthews and Zhang (2010) and Chang et al. (2012). 
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during 2002-2008.6 These declines in market shares have been mirrored in considerable 
increases in those of especially the JSCBs and of the CCBs as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Competition may also have benefited from the growing role of foreign banks. An 
important catalyst here was China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. Under the conditions of 
WTO membership, the activities of foreign banks were liberalised profoundly. For example, 
these banks were allowed to provide foreign currency services to Chinese residents and were 
permitted greater freedom in local currency operations as well. Furthermore, the participation 
of foreign investors in Chinese banks was promoted, with foreigners being allowed take equity 
stakes of up to 25%. Chinese banking markets have been opened to foreign competition 
rather comprehensively since the end of 2006, with foreign banks receiving in principle the 
same regulatory treatment as their Chinese counterparts and expanding their business further 
into the rest of the country (Yao et al., 2008; Matthews and Zhang, 2010; Xu, 2011). The 
foreign liberalisation of Chinese banking resulted in a sharp increase in the number of foreign 
players, whose number increased in our sample from four in 1996 to 26 in 2008 (see Section 
5). Table 1 shows that the market shares of foreign banks in total assets and loans increased 
as well during 1996-2008, but remained below 1%. Their share in pre-tax profits rose to an 
annual average of above 1% in 2001-2008, reflecting a return on assets that has been the 
highest of all banking groups. 
Despite the relatively small market shares of foreign banks in China, in our view the 
importance of their role in Chinese banking should not be underestimated. Namely, it has 
been argued rather widely that the impact of foreign banks on bank efficiency and 
competition may have significantly exceeded what their modest presence in China may 
suggest. First, various studies suggest that both the threat of foreign entry and its actual 
realisation forced Chinese banks to respond in terms of improving their business models, 
efficiency, market practices and hence their degree of competitiveness (He and Fan, 2004; 
Leung and Chan, 2006). Second, foreign banks have obtained minority equity stakes in 
various Chinese banks, which overall seem to have had positive effects on the efficiency 
and/or performance of the latter and hence likely on competition in Chinese banking markets 
                                                                          
6. We present the data for the full sample of 1996-2008 and the two subsamples that we use (1996-2001 and 2002-
2008), with 2001 being the year of China’s entry into the WTO.  
 
Overview of the Chinese banking sector 1996–2008 Table 1 
 Share of total assets (%) Share of total loans (%) Share of total deposits (%) 
  SOCB JSCB CCB FOREIGN SOCB  JSCB CCB FOREIGN SOCB JSCB CCB FOREIGN 
Average 1996–2001 86.32 11.83 1.69 0.16 88.03 10.54 1.29 0.14 87.55 11.41 0.90 0.14 
Average 2002–2008 72.17 21.25 5.78 0.79 71.30 22.40 5.43 0.87 74.47 21.51 3.43 0.59 
Average 1996–2008 78.70 16.91 3.89 0.50 79.02 16.93 3.52 0.53 80.51 16.85 2.26 0.38 
 Share of total securities (%) Share of pre-tax profits (%) Return on assets (%) 
  SOCB JSCB CCB FOREIGN SOCB JSCB CCB FOREIGN SOCB JSCB CCB FOREIGN 
Average 1996–2001 81.16 15.62 3.15 0.06 71.21 23.83 4.52 0.43 0.16 0.70 1.03 0.99 
Average 2002–2008 76.45 17.20 5.95 0.41 71.85 21.19 5.90 1.05 0.72 0.45 0.63 0.93 
Average 1996–2008 78.62 16.47 4.66 0.25 71.77 21.54 5.72 0.97 0.46 0.57 0.82 0.96 
Source: BankScope, authors’ own calculations. The data are presented for the full sample of 1996–2008 and the two subsamples that we 
use in the estimations (1996–2001 and 2002–2008), with 2001 being the year of China’s entry in the WTO. 
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(Berger et al., 2010). Third, foreign banks have tried to penetrate into other parts of China 
beyond the main cities through equity partnerships or less institutionalised forms of co-
operation with Chinese banks with either geographical significance or appreciable levels of 
national coverage (He and Fan, 2004; Leung and Chan, 2006). Fourth, some observers claim 
that foreign banks have demonstrated that they are capable of snatching significant market 
shares away from Chinese banks, such as in RMB loan and deposit markets in key cities 
such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou (Xu and Lin, 2007). Finally, Xu (2011) provides 
empirical evidence that foreign bank entry into China has been supportive of developing a 
more competitive banking industry. All in all, we believe that these arguments support the 
inclusion of foreign banks in empirical investigations of bank competition in China.  
Another important reform affecting Chinese loan markets was the replacement of the 
PBC’s binding credit plan system with an indicative non-binding credit target, effective from 1 
January 1998, with this target serving only as a reference for commercial banks (Mo, 1999). 
Until then, the PBC had controlled the lending of SOCBs through binding credit quotas, which 
set the lower limit for new loans to be made annually and stipulated their allocation to specific 
sectors (Wong and Wong, 2001). Hence, since 1998, in principle Chinese banks have 
become free to lend according to commercial considerations, with the formal abolishment of 
policy loans that were provided in compliance with state directives or planning targets instead 
of on the basis of proper credit assessments. This change in policy has been hailed by 
Chinese monetary authorities as an important step in transforming the credit culture of 
Chinese banks.  
Notwithstanding the significance of the abolishment of the credit plan system, there 
are clear signs of continuing quantitative controls on bank credit, which potentially may affect 
the lending policies of banks in China. Various observers emphasise the use by the PBC of 
quantitative instruments aimed at controlling credit growth, despite the discontinuation of the 
binding credit plan system (Goodfriend and Prasad, 2006; Liu and Xie, 2006; Delatte, 2007; 
Geiger, 2008; Du, 2010; Fukumoto et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2010; He and Wang, 2011 and 
2012; Ma et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2012; Martin, 2012; World Bank, 2012). These include 
yearly aggregate target levels for new loans and the use of so-called window guidance to 
influence the development of bank lending. The latter policy can be described as a form of 
moral suasion aimed at controlling in principle the sectoral direction of lending, although it is 
suspected that in practice the guidance has also affected the amount of lending (Green, 
2005; Okazaki, 2007).  
The reform of the credit control system has been followed – in terms of degree of 
deregulation – by interest rate liberalisation, resulting in relatively liberalised bank interest rates in 
2004, when the deposit rate floor and the lending rate ceiling were eliminated for the major 
banks (Figure 1, left-hand panel).7 The liberalisation of the ceiling on the lending rate and the 
floor on the deposit rate in October 2004 implied that Chinese banks benefited from a more or 
less guaranteed minimum interest rate spread (due to the remaining floor on the lending rate 
and ceiling on deposit rate), while they faced no restrictions with respect to its potential 
maximum width (García-Herrero et al., 2005). The lending rate floor should inhibit competition to 
some extent, although probably not in a binding manner.8 In fact, during December 2004 and 
                                                                          
7. The PBC started to widen the floating band on banks’ interest rates from 1998 onwards, after it liberalised interbank 
interest rates. Hence, it gave commercial banks more discretion in setting loan rates (People’s Bank of China, 2005; 
Feyzioğlu et al., 2009). 
8. Fu and Heffernan (2009) mention that Chinese banks have always had some discretion over certain loan rates. For 
example, from 1999, small business loans could carry a premium of up to 30% (50% for the rural credit cooperatives) 
over the central bank rate.  
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December 2008 only between 19% and 29% of all loans were made at the floor lending rate, 
suggesting that most loan rates were higher (Figure 1, right-hand panel). In contrast, empirical 
research has suggested that the ceiling on deposit rates has been binding and put them at a 
level below equilibrium (Feyzioğlu et al., 2009; He and Wang, 2011; Ma et al., 2011).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The liberalisation of both credit controls and interest rates has had important positive 
repercussions for Chinese banks’ lending policies. Many observers adhere to the view that 
these policies have become more market-oriented, characterised by increasing attention to 
risk management and loan monitoring and by greater diversification into less traditional areas 
such as consumer lending (Allen et al., 2005; Leung and Chan, 2006; Abiad et al., 2010; 
Herd et al., 2010; Qian et al., 2011; IMF, 2011). In principle, this development should have 
been supportive of enhancing competitive conditions in Chinese loan markets. 
This development has been aided by the establishment of the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2003, which helped bring lending policy more into line with 
market-conform assessment and approval criteria (Yeung, 2009). Moreover, since October 
2004, when Chinese banks were permitted to use their own judgement in setting lending 
rates, credit risk has been much better reflected in the lending rate setting process (People’s 
Bank of China, 2005). Another important improvement is that lending decisions have become 
more centralised through a reduction of the autonomy of regional offices and branches, and 
of any possible interference by local and regional governments and Party officials (He and 
Fan, 2004; Dobson and Kashyap, 2006). All in all, it has been suggested that banks in China 
have been considerably freed from political pressure, for example to make loans to support 
state-owned enterprises (Lardy, 2006).9 This should foster a more competitive environment. 
To conclude, this brief summary of financial reform and banking structure in China 
yields a number of important insights for our analysis of competitive conditions in Chinese 
loan markets. First, the process of financial reform has led to a fundamental change in the 
orientation of Chinese banks from mere instruments of economic and industrial policy 
                                                                          
9. Notwithstanding proofs of considerable government interference, Cull and Xu (2000) provide evidence that lending by 
Chinese banks to state-owned companies was guided by credit risk considerations as well. 
Interest rates in China Figure 1
Panel A: One-year interest rates (in %) Panel B: Share of loans issued at different rates (in %) 
Sources: CEIC database, Authors’ own calculations. All rates are one-year rates. 
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towards in essence commercially oriented providers of a broad range of financial services to 
non-financial corporations, central, regional and local governments and households (Cheng 
and Degryse, 2010).10 Second, more specifically, the lending policies of Chinese banks have 
been founded much more on market-based criteria. This has been aided by the liberalisation 
of interest rates and strict credit controls. Loan rates have been liberalised gradually since 
1998, first by increasing their ceilings and later by removing them altogether. Moreover, the 
abolishment of binding credit plans has provided banks in China with greater opportunities to 
diversify and optimise their lending business. As demonstrated by Abiad et al. (2010), the 
process of financial reform has made the biggest advances regarding credit controls. We 
concur with Huang (2010) that credit allocation has increasingly become more market-
oriented. Third, notwithstanding the growing adherence to market principles in Chinese 
banks’ lending policies, the fact that the PBC has continued, at least during certain episodes, 
to provide loan guidelines is important for our investigation. While the effectiveness of these 
quantitative instruments is not clear and may actually have been limited, their continued use 
makes us rather sceptical about employing banks’ market shares to assess competitive 
conditions in Chinese loan markets.11 Finally, the international liberalisation of China has 
promoted the presence and most likely the influence of foreign banks, arguably most 
importantly through their impact on the strategies and operations of Chinese banks. Overall, 
the broad range of financial reform measures implemented may have promoted over time a 
priori competitive conditions in Chinese banking markets.  
3.2 Empirical literature on bank efficiency and competition in China 
One of the most frequently investigated aspects of the Chinese banking sector is its 
efficiency.12 Most studies have characterised Chinese banks as still being relatively inefficient, 
despite improvements since the highly regulated and inefficient banking system of the past 
(Fu and Heffernan, 2007; Yao et al., 2007; Berger et al., 2009a; García-Herrero et al., 2009). 
This also applies when they are compared with their international peers operating outside 
China (Singh Pritam Singh and Munisamy, 2008; Löchel and Li, 2011; Allen et al., 2012).13 To 
what extent bank efficiency in China has improved over time is still subject to considerable 
debate, although some studies have argued that considerable efficiency gains have been 
realised in more recent years (see for example: Matthews et al., 2009; Barros et al., 2011).  
The discussion on efficiency improvements has concentrated on two issues, which in 
empirical studies often yield mixed results (Berger et al., 2009a; Chang et al., 2012): the 
impact of bank deregulation on bank efficiency (Kumbhakar and Wang, 2007; Fu and 
Heffernan, 2007) and the relationship between the efficiency and performance of banks in 
China. On the former, some support the view that efficiency has improved in parallel with the 
process of financial reform (Feyzioğlu, 2009), while others are more sceptical and tend to 
                                                                          
10. It needs to be acknowledged that some observers remain rather sceptical about the degree of progress achieved in 
Chinese financial reform. For example, World Bank (2012) concludes that “[d]espite the many reforms introduced so far, 
the Chinese financial system remains oppressed, unbalanced, costly to maintain and potentially unstable. […] Continued 
protection and intervention in the business decisions of financial institutions make them convenient policy instruments, 
the use of which prolongs the bureaucratic culture and distorted incentives that have prevented banks from full 
commercialization and from allocation of financial resources to the most productive uses”. 
11. Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2011 and 2013) use market shares in loan markets to investigate competition in a number of 
mature economies. 
12. Most of the empirical studies focus on cost and profit efficiency using the stochastic frontier approach; examples 
include: Fu and Heffernan (2007), Feyzioğlu (2009), Berger et al. (2009a). Some researchers focus on technology 
efficiency and sources of total factor productivity growth by constructing various productivity indices (Chang et al., 2012; 
Matthews et al., 2009). Chang et al. (2012) provide a comprehensive review of various efficiency measures applied to 
Chinese banking.    
13. In contrast, Matthews et al. (2009) argue that Chinese banks have achieved significant improvements in bank 
efficiency and hence may not be out of line with international bank efficiency benchmarks. 
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highlight that, despite tangible liberalisation efforts, China’s banking sector is still relatively 
inefficient or not sufficiently commercially oriented (Allen et al., 2005; Dobson and Kashyap, 
2006; Podpiera, 2006). A few studies document that reforms during the early 1990s did not 
seem to have affected performance (Park and Sehrt, 2001). On the latter, some studies 
demonstrate that Chinese bank performance has been affected positively by efficiency 
improvements, and that more profitable banks tend to be more efficient than less profitable 
banks (Heffernan and Fu, 2010; García-Herrero et al., 2009). In contrast, alternative ones 
emphasise that the high profitability of Chinese banks which has been observed in recent 
years, for example in terms of both return on average assets and equity in comparison with 
those of international peers, is not correlated with their efficiency, but is largely driven by wide 
interest rate spreads between loan and deposit rates and low personnel costs (Feyzioğlu, 
2009; Löchel and Li, 2011).  
Results of empirical studies on the efficiency of Chinese banks are the most 
conclusive when conducted for specific banking groups. The SOCBs seem to have been the 
least efficient commercial banks in China, especially in comparison with the JSCBs and/or 
foreign banks (Kumbhakar and Wang, 2007; Fu and Heffernan, 2007; Yao et al., 2007; Ariff 
and Can, 2008; Berger et al., 2009a; Feyzioğlu, 2009; Fu and Heffernan, 2009; Lin and 
Zhang, 2009; Matthews et al., 2009). Some argue that this may be related to their relative 
lack of shareholder diversification, compared with JSCBs, CCBs and foreign banks, whose 
plurality of shareholders may reduce political interference (Ferri, 2009). Shih et al. (2007) and 
Feyzioğlu (2009) find that the JSCBs perform significantly better than both the SOCBs and 
CCBs. Moreover, the impact of Chinese WTO membership since 2001 on bank efficiency has 
been investigated. Some studies show that the efficiency of domestic Chinese banks 
weakened after China’s accession to the WTO, while that of foreign banks increased 
(Rezvanian et al., 2011). Regarding specific aspects of international liberalisation, a recent 
study shows that reforms which promoted foreign (and reduced state) ownership of Chinese 
banks had strong favourable effects on their efficiency (Berger et al., 2009a). García-Herrero 
and Santabárbara (2008) demonstrate that this applies especially to foreign participation 
through minority strategic partnerships (see also Hasan and Xie, 2012). Berger et al. (2010) 
show that foreign ownership has some positive effects on performance, as it mitigates certain 
adverse effects of business diversification. On the other hand, Heffernan and Fu (2010) argue 
that foreign equity investment did not have a significant influence on performance (measured 
by different indicators). 
Only a few papers investigate explicitly and in-depth competition in the Chinese 
banking sector by using econometric tools, while others discuss it on the sidelines and often 
adopt more descriptive approaches. One of the first to address this issue adopts the 
structural approach (see Section 2) and calculates concentration indicators (HHI) which show 
high degrees of concentration that may inhibit competition (Wong and Wong, 2001). 
Furthermore, this study concentrates qualitatively on institutional characteristics which 
inhibited bank competition in China during the 1990s, such as government interference, 
information deficiencies and a weak legal infrastructure. At the same time, this study 
acknowledges that reforms stipulated under the conditions for China’s WTO accession 
helped to create a more competitive and efficient banking system.  
Turning to non-structural approaches, Yuan (2006), using the Panzar-Rosse method, 
investigates bank competition in China during 1996-2000, just before the country joined the 
WTO in 2001. The paper concludes that the banking system in China was already close to a 
state of perfect competition before foreign banks began to enter Chinese banking more 
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extensively. Fu and Heffernan (2009) look at the effect of financial reform on China’s banking 
structure and performance during 1985-2002 and draw the conclusion that the estimation of 
structure-performance models lends some support to the existence of relative market power 
in the 1980s and early 1990s. Overall, they conclude that to improve competition, new 
policies should be adopted to encourage market entry and to increase the market share of 
the most efficient banks. Fu (2009) looks at competition in Chinese commercial banking, also 
by using the Panzar-Rosse method. Based on a sample of 76 banks for the period 1997-
2006, it is concluded that China’s overall banking market was perfectly competitive in 2001, 
but featured monopolistic competition thereafter until 2006. Thus, the paper supports the 
conclusion of Yuan (2006) that the Chinese banking sector was close to a state of perfect 
competition before China joined the WTO and that WTO membership might not promote 
overall bank competition further. Moreover, Fu (2009) shows that the H-statistic for core 
commercial banking activities was higher before WTO entry than after, suggesting that 
competition in Chinese loan markets was higher during the period before joining the WTO 
than in the period after. Bikker et al. (2007), as part of an investigation of 101 countries with 
the Panzar-Rosse model, also measure competition in Chinese banking and have results 
suggesting perfect competition. However, they warn that these results should be interpreted 
with great caution due to the limitations of the Panzar-Rosse model for China.  
A few studies apply the Lerner index to Chinese banking. Fungáčová et al. (2012) 
find that competition in the Chinese banking industry declined, based on a sample of 76 
banks during 2002-2011. They also find that competition differs depending on the type of 
banks, with foreign banks being the most competitive (ie lowest Lerner index). Also 
Soedarmono et al. (2013) report lower competition in Chinese banking over time, as part of 
an investigation of 11 Asian banking systems for 1994-2009 (for China, covering 103 banks). 
Both papers report Lerner indices for China that lie predominantly between 0.3 and 0.4 for 
2002-2008. 
All in all, the results of empirical studies, both for China and more generally (see 
Section 2), point to several lessons for the analysis of bank competition in China. First, it may 
be worthwhile to compare the results of various measures of competition, such as the Lerner 
index, Panzer-Rosse and PE approaches, since a priori the literature does not suggest a 
superior method. Second, concentration indicators do not seem to be appropriate 
competition measures. Hence, we do not employ them in our analysis. Finally, banking 
deregulation and foreign bank entry generally have affected bank competition favourably. This 
may be a finding especially relevant for China, taking into account its elaborate process of 
financial reform. 
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4 Competition measures: methodology and theory. 
In this section, we discuss the conventional Lerner and elasticity-adjusted Lerner measures 
(4.1) and the relatively new Profit Elasticity (PE) indicator (4.2). We theoretically show that the 
former fail to measure competition correctly when interest rates are regulated, while the latter 
does not suffer from this shortcoming (4.3).  
Our discussion of the conventional Panzar-Rosse H-statistic is conducted in 
Appendix A, as its flaws in measuring competition under regulated interest rates are rather 
clear and do not require a theoretical assessment. Namely, if due to binding regulation 
deposit and lending rates move in step, the H-statistic will be biased upwards and measure 
incorrectly a higher degree of competition. We adopt the H-statistic merely to replicate and 
check the results of Yuan (2006) and Fu (2009). 
4.1 Lerner and elasticity-adjusted Lerner indices 
4.1.1 LERNER INDEX 
The Lerner index reflects firms’ ability to set prices over marginal costs. Fierce competition will 
lower its level, as firms reduce prices towards marginal costs. In the extreme case of perfect 
competition, the Lerner index will be reduced to zero, while with monopoly it will reach one. 
The traditional Lerner index has been applied widely in empirical competition literature 
(Fernández de Guevara et al., 2005 and 2007; Berger et al., 2009b).14 However, to the best of 
our knowledge, only Fungáčová et al. (2012) conducted an in-depth analysis based on this 
measure for Chinese banking markets during the post-WTO accession period. Our approach 
differs in the sense that we do not focus on bank competition in general but instead 
concentrate on competition in loan markets. Hence, we define the Lerner index as:  
 it it it itL p mc p    (4.1) 
where pit denotes the price of a loan for bank i at time t, which is defined as total 
interest income divided by total loans, while mcit are marginal costs of loans.  
In order to be able to calculate marginal costs of loans, we first estimate a Translog 
Cost Function (TCF) using individual bank observations (Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2007). This 
function assumes that the technology of an individual bank can be described by one 
multiproduct production function. Under proper conditions, a dual cost function can be 
derived from such a production function, using output levels and factor prices as arguments. 
A TCF is a second-order Taylor expansion around the mean of a generic dual cost function 
with all variables appearing as logarithms. It is a flexible functional form that has proven to be 
an effective tool in explaining multiproduct bank services. Our TCF has the following form: 
   0 1,..., 1 1,..., 1
1,..., 1,..., 1,...,
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ln ln ln
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 
   
  
    
       (4.2) 
where the dependent variable cit reflects the production costs of bank i (i = 1, .., N ) 
in year t (t = 1, .., T ). dt are year dummies and dh are bank type dummies (h = SOCB, JSCB, 
                                                                          
14. The various measures that we adopt in this paper can be linked theoretically. For example, Shaffer (1983) demonstrated 
that the Lerner index can be derived in terms of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic. We consider this as future work. 
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CCB).15 The explanatory variables xikt represent three groups of variables (k = 1, .., K ).  
The first group consists of (K1) bank output components, such as loans, securities and other 
services (proxied by other income). The second group consists of (K2) input prices, such as 
wage rates, deposit rates (as price of funding) and the price of other expenses (proxied  
as the ratio of other expenses to fixed assets). The third group consists of (K - K1 - K2)  
control variables, eg the equity ratio. In line with Berger and Mester (1997), the equity ratio 
corrects for differences in loan portfolio risk across banks (Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2007). vit is 
the error term. 
Two standard properties of cost functions are linear homogeneity in the input prices 
and cost exhaustion (see eg Beattie and Taylor, 1985; Jorgenson, 1986). They impose the 
following restrictions on the parameters, assuming – without loss of generality – that the 
indices j and k of the two sum terms in equation (4.2) are equal to 1, 2 or 3, respectively, for 
wages, funding rates and prices of other expenses: 
1 2 3 ,1 ,22 3 ,1 30 1,2,3, 0 4, ...,1, j jk j k k kє є є for j and є є є for k K               (4.3) 
The first restriction stems from cost exhaustion, reflecting the fact that the sum of 
cost shares is equal to unity. In other words, the value of the three inputs is equal to total 
costs. Linear homogeneity in the input prices requires that the three linear input price 
elasticities (δi) add up to one, whereas the squared and cross terms of all explanatory 
variables (εij) add up to zero. Again without loss of generality, we also apply symmetry 
restrictions εj,k = εjk for j,k = 1,…, K.  
The marginal costs of loans are obtained by differentiating the TCF (4.2) with respect 
to loans, namely: 
 1 1,1 1 ...,1 ; 1ln ln2 l ilt k K k l ki t it i tt ikmc c x є x є x      (4.4) 
Once marginal costs of loans are obtained, an individual bank’s Lerner index is 
calculated according to equation (4.1). The yearly Lerner index Lt is then the average of the 
individual Lit for each year t, and the subsample Lerner index Lsubsample is the average of the 
individual bank’s Lerner indices for each subsample. The subsamples are the periods pre-
WTO (1996-2001) and post-WTO (2002-2008).  
4.1.2 ELASTICITY-ADJUSTED LERNER INDEX 
The traditional Lerner index cannot distinguish markets that have high margins due to inelastic 
demand from markets that have high margins because they are less competitive or perhaps 
collusive (Corts, 1999, p. 31). To overcome this problem, the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index 
has been developed (Genesove and Mullin, 1998; Corts, 1999; Wolfram, 1999; Van 
Leuvensteijn, 2008). More precisely, this measure normalises the Lerner index for the price 
elasticity of demand. 
We estimate the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index following Angelini and Cetorelli 
(2003). We provide only a very brief introduction of this indicator, since it is rather standard in 
the literature. Bank i solves the following profit-maximising problem: 
                                                                          
15. In this section, we assume that cost functions for each bank type are similar, as only the constant term is allowed to 
vary across bank groups through bank type dummies. The alternative approach is to assume different cost functions for 
each bank type by allowing bank type dummies to interact with independent variables. We follow this approach in 
Appendix E (E.5) as an additional robustness test. 
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   ,qi i i iMax p Q q C q w    (4.5) 
where Q= Σiqi is the total amount of bank loans in loan markets and qi is the loan 
provided by bank i. C(qi, wi) is the cost function of bank i, and wi represents the vector of 
factor input prices. The corresponding first-order condition is:  
 ' ,i i i ip C q w     (4.6) 
where Θi is defined as the conjectural elasticity of total industry output with respect 
to the output of bank i, and ε is the market semi-price elasticity of demand, namely Θi = 
(dQ/dqi)/(Q/qi) and ε = (dQ/dp)/Q. In a perfectly competitive market, Θi equals zero for all 
banks i, while in a monopoly market Θi equals one. The separate identification of these two 
elasticities requires the simultaneous estimation of a supply and demand equation (Angelini 
and Cetorelli, 2003). 
Appelbaum (1982) suggests that it is sufficient to estimate the ratio λ = Θi/ε if the 
goal is to evaluate the industry’s overall degree of market power.16 The elasticity-adjusted 
Lerner index will then be defined as L = λ/p, where p is the average price of loans. Market 
power depends on both the elasticity of demand and the degree of competition, measured by 
conjectural variation.  
To identify λ and the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index, we estimate simultaneously a 
Translog Cost Function (TCF) and the supply equation, imposing cross-equation restrictions. 
The TCF and marginal costs of loans are defined the same way as equations (4.2) and (4.4), 
respectively.  
Substituting the marginal costs equation (4.4) into the supply equation (4.6), we 
obtain:  
            (4.7) 
where dt is a year dummy and εit is the error term.   
To access the evolution of bank competition measured by the elasticity-adjusted 
Lerner index, we perform two types of regressions: yearly estimates and subsample 
estimates. The yearly elasticity-adjusted Lerner index is then derived as λt/pt, where pt is the 
yearly average loan rate. To obtain subsample estimates of the elasticity-adjusted Lerner 
index, we regress simultaneously equations (4.2) and (4.7), replacing year dummies dt with 
subsample dummies in both equations. The subsample elasticity-adjusted Lerner index is 
then defined as λsubsample/psubsample, where psubsample is the average loan rate for each subsample. 
The estimation is carried out with three-stage least squares (3SLS). To control for 
endogeneity of the cost and quantity variables, we employ one-period lagged variables as 
instruments; therefore the results are available starting from 1997. 
Unlike the traditional Lerner index, the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index has the 
advantage of allowing for formal tests whether its estimated values over time are statistically 
different from zero or one and whether subsample estimates differ significantly. These 
                                                                          
16. As a robustness test, we estimate explicitly the conjectural variation parameter as a direct measure of competition in 
Appendix E (E.3).  
ൌ ( 1 ൅ 2 1 ൅ 1ൌ1… ; ) ൅ ൌ1… 1 ൅
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advantages are crucial for our research, as we want to investigate if competitive conditions 
changed significantly over time.  
4.2 The Profit Elasticity (PE) model 
The PE indicator, or Relative Profit Differences (RPD), is based on the notion, first, that 
more efficient firms (that is, firms with lower marginal costs) gain higher market shares or 
profits and, second, that this effect is stronger the heavier the competition in that market is 
(Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2007). While RPD can be seen as the theoretical model underlying 
this work, the PE indicator is the empirical operationalisation of this model. Boone (2008) 
shows that there is a continuous and monotonically increasing relationship between RPD 
and the level of competition if firms are ranked by decreasing efficiency. In other words, 
there is a negative relationship between efficiency, measured in terms of marginal costs, 
and profits; the more intense this negative relationship is, the more competitive markets will 
be. So, in practice, the PE indicator will have a negative sign when the relationship between 
marginal costs and profits is estimated, and it will be more negative the higher the level of 
competition is.  
The fact that this relationship is both continuous and monotonic is the main 
advantage of RPD over more traditional measures of competition such as the HHI and Lerner 
index (or PCM approaches). Another advantage is that RPD and the PE indicator are not 
dependent on assumptions about the type of competitive model, such as whether this is 
Bertrand or Cournot competition.17  
The PE indicator (also referred to as the Boone indicator) has been developed in a 
broad set of theoretical models (Boone, 2000, 2001 and 2008; Boone et al., 2004; Boone et 
al., 2007; CPB, 2000). Following Boone et al. (2004), and replacing “firms” with “banks”, we 
consider a banking industry where each bank i produces one product qi (or portfolio of 
banking products), which faces a demand curve of the form: 
 ,i j i i j i jp q q a bq d q      (4.8) 
and has constant marginal costs mci. This bank maximises profits πi = (pi - mci) qi by 
choosing the optimal output level qi. We assume that a>mci and 0<d≤b. The first-order 
condition for a Cournot-Nash equilibrium can then be written as: 
2 0i i j j ia bq d q mc      (4.9) 
When N banks produce positive output levels, we can solve the N first-order 
conditions (4.9), yielding: 
         
2 1 2 1
2 1 2 1
i j j
i i
b d a b d N mc mc
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b d N b d
            
 (4.10) 
We define profits πi as variable profits excluding entry costs ε. Hence, a bank enters 
the banking industry if, and only if, πi≥ε in equilibrium. Note that Equation (4.10) provides a 
relationship between output and marginal costs.  
                                                                          
17. Cournot competition is an economic model used to describe an industry structure in which companies compete on 
the amount of output they will produce, which they decide on independently of each other and at the same time. 
Bertrand competition assumes that firms compete on price and not output quantity (market shares). For more detail, see 
Tirole (1988).   
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It follows from πi (mci) = (pi - mci) qi that profits depend on marginal costs in a 
quadratic way, ie 
                                 
(4.11) 
The theoretical concept RPD is then defined as (π(mc**)- π(mc))/(π (mc*)- π(mc)) for 
any three firms with mc**<mc*<mc. In this market, competition can increase in two ways. First, 
competition increases when the produced services of the various banks become closer 
substitutes, that is, d increases (keeping d below b). Second, competition increases when 
entry costs ε decline. Boone (2008) proves that RPD is an increasing function of interaction 
among existing firms (dRPD/dd>0) and a decreasing function of entry costs (dRPD/dε<0). In 
other words, RPD increases when competition intensifies, ie fiercer competition increases 
(decreases) profits of more efficient firms by larger (smaller) amounts than those of less 
efficient firms. Hence, competition rewards efficiency, a concept that can be traced back to 
Demsetz’s (1973) efficiency structure hypothesis. 
Boone (2008) demonstrates how RPD can measure the level and evolution of 
competition in practice. Firms are first ranked by their efficiency level. Subsequently, RPD of 
firm i are normalised by calculating its relative profit difference against the profits of the most 
and the least efficient firms. This procedure yields a normalised RPD curve as a function of 
normalised relative efficiency differences. The level of competition is then represented by the 
area under the normalised RPD curve. Since changes in competition move all points on the 
RPD curve monotonically, shifts in this curve measure the evolution in competition.  
Although this procedure is mathematically elegant, it is computationally intensive, as 
it requires the ranking of firms by efficiency levels (ie marginal costs) for each year. 
Conversely, most empirical studies that adopt Boone’s work regress the logarithm of profits 
on the logarithm of marginal costs to capture the essence of RPD. They refer to the estimated 
elasticity of profits with regard to marginal costs, ie dln(π)/dln(mc), as the PE indicator (Boone 
et al., 2004 and 2007; Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2007; Tabak et al., 2012). This indicator is in 
theory negative, reflecting the fact that higher marginal costs are associated with lower profits. 
In addition, its value should be lower the more competitive market conditions are. The PE 
indicator is based on the same theoretical foundation as RPD, as they both capture the 
central idea that less efficient firms are punished more in more competitive markets. Boone et 
al. (2007) conducted simulations for the PE indicator and found that changes in competition 
are correctly identified with this measure. Unlike the computationally intensive RPD, the PE 
indicator has the advantage that it can be easily estimated in practice and has a rather 
straightforward interpretation. We therefore employ the PE indicator to measure competition 
in the next section.  
We note that the PE indicator model, like every other model, is a simplification of 
reality (Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2007). First, efficient banks may choose to translate lower 
costs either into higher profits or into lower output prices in order to gain market share. Our 
approach assumes that banks in China compete on efficiency in order to predominantly 
increase profits and not to expand market share, given quantitative restrictions in the form 
of explicit lending quotas and informal window guidance (see Section 3.1). Even when 
some banks would choose to increase profits by lowering their price and increasing their 
market share, the PE indicator would also measure this effect. Still, we assume that this 
ሺ ሻ ൌ ሺ2 1ሻ ሺ2 ൅ 1ሻ ൅[(2 ൅ ሺ 1ሻ)ሺ2 1ሻ] ሺ ሻ
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ignores differences in bank product quality and design, as well as the attractiveness of 
innovations. We assume that banks are forced over time to provide quality levels that are 
more or less similar. By the same token, we presume that banks have to follow the 
innovations of their peers. Hence, like many other model-based measures, the Boone 
indicator approach focuses on one important relationship (that between efficiency and 
profits), thereby disregarding other aspects (see also Bikker and Bos, 2005). All in all, the 
PE indicator may be applied in relatively homogeneous product markets where product 
innovation and differences in quality do not matter too much. Therefore, we focus only on 
competition in loan markets and not on overall bank competition in China. Naturally, annual 
estimates of the PE indicator are more likely to be impaired by these distortions than the 
estimates covering the full sample period. Hence, in addition to annual estimates, we 
provide point estimates for the full 1996-2008 period and the subsample periods 1996-
2001 and 2002-2008, 2001 being the year of China’s entry into the WTO.  
4.3 Competition measures under interest rate regulation 
To understand the direct effect of binding deposit rate regulation on the Lerner index and 
RPD, we consider the simple model described in Section 4.2. Binding deposit rate regulation 
in China affects the level of marginal costs of all banks and redistributes market share 
between efficient and inefficient banks. We show below that this redistribution of output can 
result in both increasing and decreasing competition as indicated by the Lerner index, which 
makes it an inconsistent measure of competition under binding deposit rate regulation. On the 
other hand, RPD is continuous and monotone in competition in a market with binding deposit 
rate regulation. In the following exercise, we assume that the slope of the loan demand 
function does not change after exogenous movements in input prices. To keep it simple, we 
also assume that deposit rate regulation does not affect the number of banks operating in the 
market, eg we do not allow market exit and entry due to changes in deposit rate regulation.   
Imposing a deposit rate ceiling should reduce the level of competition because more 
efficient banks cannot undercut less efficient rivals by setting deposit rates above the ceiling. 
Less efficient banks then are protected by the ceiling and are less likely to be forced out of 
the market. Abolishing or raising deposit ceilings should increase competition because more 
efficient banks can expand market share at the expense of their less efficient rivals.  
We assume that deposit rate regulation has a homogeneous impact on each bank’s 
marginal costs. Then, under regulation, a bank’s marginal cost of loans becomes mci (ε) = mci 
– ε (i = 1,…, N). ε is a regulation parameter, which measures the extent to which deposit rate 
regulation is binding. ε ϵ (-ἓ, mc), where mc is the marginal cost of the most efficient bank and 
ἓ is some positive number that allows the least efficient bank to remain profitable and stay in 
the market. A positive ε reflects a binding deposit rate ceiling, while a negative ε corresponds 
to a binding deposit rate floor. Higher values of ε lead to less competition. This parameter can 
be time-variant to reflect changes in regulation across time. We focus here on deposit rate 
regulation. Nevertheless, this general setup can also be applied to other regulations (or 
technology shocks) that impact homogenously upon the cost side of banks. From equations 
(4.8), (4.9) and (4.10), and imposing ε, we derive the effect of binding deposit rate regulation 
on optimal output: 
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where qi is the optimal output without deposit rate regulation. Given 0<d ≤b, f(ε) is 
increasing in ε and takes the same sign as ε. Hence, under a deposit rate ceiling (floor), each 
bank’s optimal output increases (decreases) by the same amount. We write the Lerner index 
for bank i as a function of regulation-free optimal output, marginal costs and the regulation 
parameter ε: 
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Taking the derivative with respect to ε and using f’(ε) = f(ε)/ε, we obtain:  
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             (4.14) 
Hence, a higher value of ε increases an individual bank’s Lerner index, indicating less 
competition, as theory would suggest. However, the aggregate Lerner index – ie for the whole 
market – might not give a consistent value because the market shares of efficient banks 
decrease due to deposit rate regulation. To see this, define the market share of bank i as si (ε) 
= qi(ε)/Σjqj (ε), and define bank k as the bank that produces at market average marginal costs, 
namely mck = Σjmcj/N. Market share under deposit rate regulation can then be written as: 
 
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          (4.15) 
Taking the derivative with respect to ε yields: 
 2 21 1i i kds b bsign sign N mc mcd d d                                   (4.16) 
It is immediately clear that the market share of bank i increases with a higher ε if, and 
only if, mci>mck. Therefore, regulation reallocates market share from efficient banks to less 
efficient banks (eg banks with marginal costs above the market average). The effect of binding 
deposit rate regulation on the aggregate Lerner index is then:  
1 1 1
k N Ni i i
i i ii i k i
ds ds dLdL L L s
d d d d                        (4.17) 
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Denote banks i = 1,…, k as low-efficiency banks, which will see their market shares 
increase. In contrast, the market share of high-efficiency banks i = k+1,…, N will decrease. All 
in all, this leaves the sign of dL/dε undetermined. Specifically, if deposit rate regulation 
reallocates sufficient market share from efficient to less efficient banks (resulting in dL/dε<0), 
then competition such as measured by the Lerner index can increase instead of decrease. 
This simple example shows that the aggregate Lerner index cannot consistently measure 
competition under deposit rate regulation.18 
In contrast, RPD is not biased due to interest rate regulation. As described in Section 
4.2, RPD is defined as the ratio of the profit differences between any three banks in the 
market. Banks can be ordered by their efficiency level (marginal costs), with more efficient 
banks providing more loans. Suppose we take three banks – A, B, C – with mcA<mcB<mcC, 
then RPD is defined as RPD = (πA – πC)/(πB – πC). Using the model presented in Section 4.2, 
profits can be written as a quadratic function of outputs. Then, after imposing deposit rate 
regulation, RPD(ε) can be rewritten as:   
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We show that RPD (ε) is decreasing in ε by taking the first-order derivative: 
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Given that qB – qA<0 and f’(ε)>0, the above equation has a negative sign, suggesting 
that higher binding regulation (ie a higher ε) will lower competition, consistent with theory. 
Hence, RPD is a consistent measure of competition in case of binding deposit rate regulation.  
We show below the two main problems with the (elasticity-adjusted) Lerner index 
when lending rate regulation is binding. First, this index mainly measures variation in 
competition resulting from changing regulation; it cannot detect competition resulting from 
shifts in demand. Second, ignoring binding price regulation leads to inconsistent estimates of 
the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index (see also Salvo, 2010).  
Consider the simple case of a monopoly bank serving the entire market under a 
lending rate ceiling.19 If this ceiling is not binding (see Panel A of Figure 2), the bank will 
choose the optimal price and quantity combination by equating marginal cost (MC) to 
marginal revenue (MR). When the demand curve shifts from D1 to D2 (da > 0),20 the 
equilibrium combination of prices and output moves from point E1 to E2, resulting in a 
higher Lerner index, or lower competition. Hence, changes in competition resulting from 
                                                                          
18. Boone (2000) provides another example where an individual firm’s Lerner index increases after competition 
intensified. Applying that model with a slight modification, it can be shown that the necessary condition for an individual 
bank’s Lerner index to be increasing in  is that the marginal cost of this bank is lower than the market average. Proof is 
available upon request. 
19. Competition is a concept closely related to market power, and in most of the literature they are considered in a 
similar fashion. Even for a monopoly, the issue of market power is relevant. We use a monopoly here for reasons of 
simplicity. The example is also valid for a market with multiple firms. See Koetter et al. (2008) for more details. 
20. For a full proof that 0da   leads to lower competition, please refer to Boone (2000).   
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exogenous shifts in the demand curve can be correctly picked up by the Lerner index. 
However, this is not the case if the lending rate ceiling is binding, as demonstrated in Panel 
B. This ceiling (Pc) prevents the bank from choosing the optimal price-output combination 
according to MR = MC. In contrast, following profit-maximising behaviour, it will choose the 
quantity at the kink of the demand curve (points E1 and E2 of Panel B), leaving the price 
unchanged at the ceiling. Therefore, changes in competition due to exogenous shifts in 
demand cannot be indentified by the Lerner index, because both prices and costs do not 
change in relation to the change in demand.  
In case both the demand curve and binding lending rate ceiling change, the Lerner 
index can pick up only variations in competition due to changes in the latter, but not those 
due to shifts in the former. In Panel B, suppose that the demand curve shifts to D2 and the 
lending rate ceiling increases to Pc’, both of which will decrease competition. The optimal 
combination of prices and output moves from E1 to E2’ and hence the Lerner index 
increases. It is immediately clear that changes in this index reflect only changes in the lending 
rate ceiling but not in the demand curve, because the new Lerner indices are the same with 
or without demand curve shifts (comparing E2’ and E1’). All in all, in the case of a binding 
lending rate ceiling, the Lerner index provides only an incomplete assessment of changes in 
competition. 
The above analysis also applies to the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index because it 
estimates the price-cost margin of an average bank. This conclusion is closely related to the 
analysis in Salvo (2010), which proves theoretically and empirically that ignoring price ceilings 
result in an over-estimation of competition by the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index in the 
context of the Brazilian cement industry. When prices are unconstrained, the traditional joint 
estimation approach (eg Bresnahan, 1982) can effectively distinguish between monopoly and 
perfect competition, as demand shifts will lead to price changes in the case of a monopoly 
but not under perfect competition. In contrast, when prices are regulated (for example, a price 
ceiling is put in place), demand shifts do not affect prices in the case of both a monopoly and 
perfect competition. 
 
Lerner index and price ceiling Figure 2 
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Thus, unless marginal costs are observed, one cannot tell whether the observed 
price-quantity combination is established under a monopoly or perfect competition. If one 
were to ignore the existence of a price ceiling and hence conclude that prices remain stable 
after a shift in demand, one would falsely reject collusion and argue in favour of competition. 
In general, if binding price ceilings are not properly accounted for, the underlying structural 
model will be misspecified. Hence, the orthogonality condition that is required for a consistent 
estimation of the related parameter will not be met. Salvo (2010) further shows that ignoring 
price ceilings may lead to an over-estimation of competition, in line with our argumentation. 
Overall, we conclude that the (elasticity-adjusted) Lerner index is a biased measure 
of competition when price ceilings are binding. We suspect that this may account for the very 
high level of competition that it obtains for the pre-WTO period in China. It is generally 
acknowledged that the lending rate ceiling was most likely binding during this period.  
In contrast, RPD uses relative profits and therefore they can pick up changes in 
competition due to demand shifts under price ceilings. For illustrative purposes, we use a 
simplifying assumption for the additional demand that may result from a binding price ceiling. 
Specifically, we assume that the extra output will be shared among banks according to their 
market share without the price ceiling. This so-called repartition rule relates to Schmalensee 
(1987). It should be noted that our proof does not depend on any specific repartition rule, as 
long as it allows more efficient banks to take on relatively more additional output after the 
price ceiling is imposed. For simplicity, we assume that b=d, meaning that the products 
provided by different banks are perfect substitutes. Denote aggregate loans that are provided 
under the price ceiling as *
a P
b
Q  ; without the ceiling, it is Q. If the ceiling is binding, Q*≥Q. 
Moreover, banks share the additional output Q* - Q according to their original market share si 
when there is no price ceiling. Then the optimal output for bank i is: 
    * * *
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Again mck are the marginal costs of producing loans for an average bank. Then 
profits of bank i are  * *i i iP mc s Q   . We focus on the demand shift parameter a and 
prove that an increasing a leads to lower competition under the price ceiling when measured 
by RPD. We reiterate that in this case the Lerner index would not detect any changes in 
competition. The RPD of any three banks under price ceiling is:  
        A A C cB B C c
P mc s P mc S
RPD a
P mc s P mc S
                  (4.21) 
Taking the derivative with respect to a, and using mcA<mcB<mcC, it can be  
shown that: 
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Hence, RPD correctly picks up changes in competition due to demand shifts when a 
price ceiling is put in place. This is its main advantage (and of the PE indicator as well) when 
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compared with the Lerner index. Both RPD and the PE indicator can measure competition 
correctly under price ceilings, while the Lerner index can only measure changes in 
competition resulting from changed ceilings, but not those resulting from shifts in demand.  
Finally, the existence of binding interest rate regulations can exarcerbate other 
shortcomings of conventional competition measures such as the Lerner index. A case in point 
is the reallocation effect identified in Boone et al. (2007). This relates to the fact that more 
intensive competition due to more aggressive conduct will reallocate output and profits from 
less efficient banks to more efficient banks. As more efficient banks usually have higher PCMs 
than less efficient banks, the PCM for the whole market, which is an (output) weighted 
average of individual banks’ PCMs, actually may increase in response to more intense 
competition. The increase in the market PCM (or aggregate Lerner index) would be 
interpreted as a decline in competition, while actually it has increased. Boone et al. (2007) 
show that the reallocation effect is particularly strong in concentrated markets. As a matter of 
fact, Chinese loan markets are highly concentrated markets, where during 2001-2008 the 
four SOCBs had an average annual market share of around 71%. It can be demonstrated 
that the reallocation effect is more profound when the regulation of interest rates is binding. 
Hence, this should make the Lerner index even less appropriate as an indicator to measure 
competition in Chinese loan markets. 
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5 Data and sample 
The main data source of our analysis is BankScope. We collect Chinese banks’ balance sheet 
data running from 1996 to 2008. This 13-year period is selected under consideration of data 
availability and to capture various banking sector reforms, including those related to WTO 
accession. Whenever BankScope does not provide sufficient information, we use various 
issues of the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, China Statistical Yearbook and 
individual banks’ annual reports to double-check and fill in missing data.  
We focus on state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), joint-stock commercial banks 
(JSCBs), city commercial banks (CCBs) and foreign banks (FOREIGN). There are other types 
of financial institutions in China, such as trust and investment corporations, rural commercial 
banks, savings banks, co-operative banks, investment banks and policy banks. We exclude 
these institutions from our investigation for several reasons. First, in the 1990s, trust and 
investment corporations were important financial institutions that operated similarly to 
commercial banks, but with less restrictions and regulations (Hong and Yan, 1997). However, 
in the late 1990s, they experienced significant problems and most of them were taken over by 
commercial banks. Since the primary focus of this paper is to assess bank competition during 
1996-2008, we believe it is safe to exclude trust and investment corporations from our 
analysis. Second, most of the other banks that are not included in our investigation capture 
only very small portions of Chinese lending markets and/or were established with different 
objectives from commercial banks. Third, there are significant data limitations for especially 
the large number of small banks that are excluded from the sample.    
In order to exclude irrelevant and unreliable observations, banks are incorporated in 
our sample only if they fulfilled the condition that total assets, loans, deposits, equity and 
other non-interest income should be positive. We lost 43 observations after applying this 
criterion, mainly due to negative non-interest income (34 observations). At the end, we are left 
with 714 observations covering 1996-2008. Our sample includes extensive information on 
127 banks, including all four SOCBs, all 13 JSCBs, 28 foreign banks21 and 82 CCBs. Table 2 
summarises the distribution of the observations. Table 3 gives a short description of the 
variables used in the estimations, such as costs, loans, securities and other services, each 
expressed as a share of total assets, income or funding. Costs are defined as the sum of 
interest expenses, personnel expenses and other expenses.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                          
21. Banks with more than 50% foreign ownership are classified as foreign banks. We only include foreign banks that 
provide separate balance sheet data for the People’s Republic of China. This means that several banks headquartered in 
Hong Kong SAR and which are classified as foreign banks by the CBRC but do not provide separate balance sheet data 
for their operations in mainland China are excluded from our sample.  
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Number and bank distribution of observations  Table 2 
 SOCB JSCB CCB FOREIGN Observations 
1996 4 9 1 4 18 
1997 4 10 3 6 23 
1998 4 10 5 7 26 
1999 4 10 9 7 30 
2000 4 10 14 5 33 
2001 4 10 17 7 38 
2002 4 10 27 8 49 
2003 4 10 33 8 55 
2004 4 12 40 8 64 
2005 4 12 55 10 81 
2006 4 13 74 11 102 
2007 4 13 73 26 116 
2008 4 13 36 26 79 
Total observations 52 142 387 133 714 
Number of banks 4 13 82 28 127 
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Mean values of key variables by bank group Table 3 
Panel A 
 SOCB JSCB CCB 
FOREIG
N WHOLE SOCB JSCB CCB 
FOREIG
N WHOLE SOCB JSCB CCB 
FOREIG
N WHOLE SOCB JSCB CCB
FOREIG
N WHOLE SOCB JSCB CCB 
FOREIG
N WHOLE
 Total costs as a share of total assets Loans as a share of total assets Securities as a share of total assets Other services as a share of total income
Interest expenses as a share of total 
funding
Average 1996-
2001 6.57 4.4 3.99 4.05 4.52 60.28 51.19 48.28 47.77 50.91 12.38 15.29 21.78 6.32 16.06 3.96 5.92 13.43 7.46 8.32 5.6 3.08 2.94 4.85 3.75 
Average 2002-
2008 2.92 3.22 3.51 2.83 3.31 55.43 58.76 54.11 57.85 55.55 28.78 21.77 22.96 10.55 21.4 9.26 6.08 9.47 18.15 10.3 1.52 1.83 2.15 2.12 2.06 
Average 1996-
2008 4.61 3.71 3.57 3.16 3.6 57.66 55.61 53.38 55.12 54.46 21.21 19.08 22.81 9.81 20.22 7.26 6.01 9.98 15.4 9.85 3.4 2.35 2.25 2.78 2.45 
Panel B 
 Other expenses as a share of fixed assets Average market share of lending1 Interest income as a share of total assets 
Personnel expenses as a share of total 
assets2 Interest income as a share of total loans 
Average 1996-
2001 33.8 69.12 58.18 108.77 68.04 22.01 1.07 0.16 0.02 3.57 6.95 5.23 4.4 6.14 5.41 0.5 0.4 0.63 0.57 0.52 11.64 10.44 9.54 16.36 11.47 
Average 2002-
2008 40.04 68.95 56.22 261.46 93.66 17.83 1.89 0.11 0.06 1.28 3.69 3.85 4.35 3.51 4.09 0.57 0.41 0.49 0.59 0.5 6.86 6.65 8.07 8.46 7.86 
Average 1996-
2008 37.16 69.02 56.47 224.22 87.68 19.76 1.55 0.12 0.05 1.82 5.19 4.43 4.36 4.14 4.39 0.54 0.41 0.51 0.59 0.5 9.07 8.22 8.26 10.36 8.69 
Panel C 
 
Other non-earning assets to total assets 
ratio3 Funding mix4 Equity to total assets ratio Other income to interest income ratio  
Average 1996-
2001 6.87 4.83 6.91 4.03 5.55 92.03 91.14 90.41 97.14 91.75 4.54 5.64 5.78 36.43 12.17 2.04 6.77 17.36 7.30 9.32          
Average 2002-
2008 0.24 1.15 2.63 2.55 2.27 96.08 91.59 89.05 58.76 84.93 3.04 4.10 5.02 26.93 8.67 10.65 6.47 11.00 16.66 11.28          
Average 1996-
2008 3.23 2.68 3.18 2.95 3.04 94.30 91.41 89.22 64.96 86.36 3.72 4.74 5.11 29.50 9.49 6.77 6.60 11.80 14.41 10.83      
All data are in percentages. “WHOLE” represents the figure for all banks in the sample.  
1  This represents the average market share of total loans (by all banks) per individual SOCB, JSCB, CCB or foreign bank.    2  Personnel expenses to assets ratio serves as a proxy of wage rate.    3  Other non-
earning assets to total assets ratio is defined as: (total assets minus loans minus other earning assets)/total assets.    4  The funding mix is defined as: customer deposits/(total funding minus deposits from 
banks). 
Source: BankScope, authors’ own calculations. 
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We divide the whole sample into two subsamples, ie the pre-WTO era (1996-2001) 
and post-WTO era (2002-2008). We choose 2001 as the break year because China’s WTO 
accession at the end of 2001 could potentially have affected the operation of Chinese banks, 
as it was accompanied by important financial reforms, and therefore may fundamentally have 
changed the competitive structure of Chinese banking markets. On average, total costs as a 
share of total assets were significantly lower for 2002-2008 for all types of banks (but the 
most for SOCBs), which is mostly due to lower interest expenses driven by lower deposit 
rates in the post-WTO era. 
The wage rate, which is proxied by the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets, 
did not change significantly. The ratio of other expenses to fixed assets stayed relatively 
stable for Chinese banks as well, while it increased significantly in the post-WTO era for 
foreign banks.  
Turning to revenues, the ratio of interest income to total assets decreased on 
average significantly for all types of banks, which is most likely the result of lower lending rates 
in the post-WTO era and increasing diversification of business activities. The latter is reflected 
in the development of the ratio of other services to total income, which increased significantly 
for all types of banks except the CCBs. However, it should be noted that income from other 
services only represented around 10% of total income, suggesting that income predominantly 
was generated through lending activity. 
To assess the relative importance of individual banks in Chinese loan markets, we 
have calculated the average market share of total loans (provided by all banks) per individual 
SOCB, JSCB, CCB and foreign bank. SOCBs had by far the largest individual share of total 
lending at around 20% of the full sample period, while those of individual CCBs and foreign 
banks were below 1%. The average market share of individual SOCBs dropped by nearly 5% 
in the post-WTO era compared with the pre-WTO era, which was the result of the increasing 
entry of new banks, as more CCBs were established and more foreign banks were allowed to 
start and expand business in China. Notwithstanding these new entries, individual JSCBs 
increased on average their market shares in loan markets post-WTO, reflecting their growing 
importance in lending activity. The average market share of total lending by individual CCBs 
and foreign banks decreased, which mainly reflects the fact that the number of these banks 
increased significantly in the post-WTO era.  
The ratio of other non-earning assets to total assets decreased on average 
significantly for all types of banks, possibly reflecting improving profitability. The funding mix, 
defined as the ratio of customer deposits to total funding (excluding bank deposits), stayed 
relatively stable for all bank types except foreign banks. The equity to assets ratio generally 
decreased mildly. The other income to interest income ratio increased significantly for SOCBs 
and foreign banks, reflecting the increasing importance of non-traditional banking activities for 
these groups.  
As in other empirical investigations of Chinese banking markets, the most 
troublesome data are those on wages. Ideally, the wage rate is the ratio of personnel 
expenses to the number of staff. However, many banks do not provide information on the 
number of their staff members, and for some banks personnel expenses data are missing as 
well. Therefore, we need to find an appropriate proxy for wages. Some researchers replace 
the missing number of employees by assuming that its growth rate is equal to that of total 
assets for a given bank (Fu and Heffernan, 2007; Altunbas et al., 2000; Rezvanian and 
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Mehdian, 2002; Vander Vennet, 2002). This approach might not be appropriate for our 
sample, as very few CCBs report the number of employees, so its growth rate cannot be 
calculated anyway. We instead follow the approach taken by Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2011) 
and proxy wages by the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. We have complete data 
on total assets; so, to generate this proxy, we only need to have relatively complete data on 
personnel expenses. We adopted the following procedure to approximate missing data. For 
banks that provide these data but not for all years, we fill in the missing values of personnel 
expenses by assuming that they grew at the same rate as non-interest expenses. This is a 
reasonable assumption, as, according to Chinese accounting standards, non-interest 
expenses are composed of personnel expenses and non-operating expenses. For banks that 
do not report personnel expenses at all, we replace missing values by assuming that the ratio 
of personnel expenses to non-interest expenses equals the average of this ratio for the 
corresponding bank group, namely peit = pejt/niejt * nieit, where pejt/niejt is the average 
personnel expenses to non-interest expenses ratio, by bank type and year; j (j = SOCBs, 
JSCBs, CCBs, FOREIGN) represents bank groups and i stands for individual banks. Since our 
sample has almost complete data on non-interest expenses, we can use this approach to 
back-engineer the missing data on personnel expenses. 
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6 Results22 
6.1 Empirical results: Lerner and elasticity-adjusted Lerner indices 
The estimation results for the cost equation (4.2) and supply equation (4.7) that form the basis for 
estimating the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index are reported in Appendix B, Table B.1. We summarise 
the results for the traditional Lerner index and elasticity-adjusted Lerner index in Table 4. 
The results for both the traditional Lerner index and the elasticity-adjusted Lerner 
index suggest a general increasing level of bank competition up to around 2002 and a 
decreasing level of bank competition afterwards. Moreover, the traditional Lerner index 
indicates a lower level of competition than the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index for most years. 
Furthermore, the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index is significantly different from zero and one for 
all years, rejecting the null hypothesis that Chinese loan markets are in a state of either perfect 
competition or monopoly. 
Turning to subsample estimates, the estimated values of the elasticity-adjusted 
Lerner index are significantly different from zero and one for each subsample as well. The 
results for both the traditional and elasticity-adjusted Lerner indices suggest that bank 
competition in the post-WTO period was lower than in the pre-WTO period, with the lowest 
level of competition registered for both indices in 2007. To test this conclusion formally, we 
conducted Chi-squared distributed Wald tests with one degree of freedom to determine 
whether the results of the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index are significantly different across the 
subsamples. Test statistics confirm that the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index for the pre-WTO 
period is lower than that for the post-WTO period, indicating strong evidence that competition 
worsened after WTO accession. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                          
22.  The results for the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic are reported in Appendix A. 
 
L e rn e r In d e x , e la s t ic ity -a d ju s te d  L e rn e r In d e x  an d  m a rg in a l co s ts   T ab le  4  
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A v era ge  
lo an  ra te  
A ve ra g e  
loan  d e po s it 
sp re a d  
E la s tic ity -
ad ju s te d  
L ern er in de x  Le rn e r in d ex   lM C  
1 9 97  0 .06 2  0 .1 68  0 .08 5  0 .3 6 7  0 .35 8  0 .0 9 5 0 .0 98  
1 9 98  0 .04 5  0 .1 18  0 .06 3  0 .3 8 1  0 .35 9  0 .0 7 9 0 .0 76  
1 9 99  0 .02 9  0 .1 02  0 .04 4  0 .2 8 8  0 .30 5  0 .0 6 4 0 .0 61  
2 0 00  0 .02 1  0 .0 98  0 .04 9  0 .2 1 2  0 .30 3  0 .0 5 6 0 .0 53  
2 0 01  0 .01 9  0 .0 86  0 .05 0  0 .2 2 4  0 .30 3  0 .0 5 2 0 .0 49  
2 0 02  0 .01 5  0 .0 71  0 .04 9  0 .2 1 4  0 .30 6  0 .0 4 5 0 .0 41  
2 0 03  0 .01 7  0 .0 71  0 .04 9  0 .2 3 5  0 .32 7  0 .0 4 7 0 .0 43  
2 0 04  0 .02 0  0 .0 68  0 .04 7  0 .2 8 8  0 .34 0  0 .0 4 7 0 .0 43  
2 0 05  0 .02 3  0 .0 79  0 .05 4  0 .2 8 7  0 .35 8  0 .0 5 2 0 .0 48  
2 0 06  0 .02 5  0 .0 79  0 .05 2  0 .3 2 4  0 .38 0  0 .0 5 2 0 .0 48  
2 0 07  0 .03 6  0 .0 79  0 .05 2  0 .4 5 2  0 .43 4  0 .0 5 0 0 .0 46  
2 0 08  0 .04 1  0 .0 94  0 .06 1  0 .4 3 9  0 .40 2  0 .0 6 0 0 .0 55  
1 9 96 – 2 0 01  0 .02 9  0 .1 15  0 .05 9  0 .2 4 9  0 .32 0  0 .0 7 1 0 .0 66  
2 0 02 – 2 0 08  0 .02 7  0 .0 79  0 .05 2  0 .3 4 2  0 .37 5  0 .0 5 1 0 .0 47  
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Our results are reinforced by Soedarmono et al. (2013) and Fungáčová et al. 
(2012),23 which also document a general decreasing trend of bank competition in China 
during 2002-2008. The latter study obtains an average Lerner index of 0.378 for this period, 
while our elasticity-adjusted Lerner index and traditional Lerner indices for the same period 
are 0.342 and 0.375, respectively. Comparison with results from studies for other countries 
show that the values obtained for China are relatively high: Berger et al. (2009b) found an 
average Lerner index of 0.22 for 23 industrial countries calculated over the period 1999-2005, 
while Carbó Valverde et al. (2009) obtained a mean of 0.16 for the European Union during 
1995-2001. At the same time, our estimates for the pre-WTO period are around 0.25, 
indicating that competition in Chinese loan markets was not that much lower than that in 
developed economies during those years. The post-WTO period, however, is significantly less 
competitive for China than for the other countries.   
Therefore, regardless of whether the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index or traditional 
Lerner index is adopted as the indicator to measure competition, we conclude that Chinese 
loan markets were relatively competitive in the pre-WTO period, while competitive conditions 
worsened later. 
6.2 Empirical results: Price Elasticity (PE) indicator 
Similarly to the Lerner index, the empirical estimation of the PE indicator starts with the 
estimation of marginal costs. In this section, we improve the marginal cost estimation by 
assuming different Translog Cost Functions (TCF) for each bank type. More specifically, we 
estimate one separate TCF for the SOCBs, JSCBs, CCBs and the foreign banks, which 
should improve the accuracy of the estimation of marginal costs. The estimation of the TCF is 
reported in Appendix C, Table C.1. Given the estimated marginal costs, we are now able to 
estimate the PE indicator. For China, we use the relationship between the marginal costs of 
individual banks and their profits: 
  1,...,1,..., 1ln lnilt t t t T t t ilt iltt T d d mc u           (6.1) 
where πilt stands for profits, dt is a time dummy, mcilt denotes marginal costs, i refers 
to bank i, l to output type “loans”, and t to year t; uilt is the error term. This provides us with 
the coefficient βt, ie the PE indicator (as is given by PE = d(lnπi)/d(lnmci)). βt is negative in 
theory, reflecting that higher marginal costs reduce profits for all banks.24 Moreover, the more 
competitive the market is, the lower the value of βt. In other words, banks are punished more 
harshly for being inefficient in more competitive markets. Note that the indicator βt is time-
dependent.  
Profits are defined as: 
 ilt ilt ilt iltx p mc    (6.2) 
where xilt denotes the total amount of loans and pilt is the loan interest rate calculated 
as interest income over loans.  
                                                                          
23. Soedarmono et al. (2013) used the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index, while Fungáčová et al. (2012) estimated the 
traditional Lerner index.  
24. In practice, a positive t is possible (Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2007), which could be the result of extreme collusion, 
market regulation or banks competing on quality (Tabak et al., 2012).   
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We expect higher profits to go hand in hand with lower marginal costs, but since our 
definition of profits is a function of marginal costs, there may be an endogeneity problem. To 
correct for this, we employ lagged marginal costs as instrument variable and investigate 
various alternative estimation techniques. 
We follow the strategy set out by Angrist and Pischke (2009) and first test whether 
the instrumental variables are weak. For this purpose, we employ Angrist-Pischke (AP) F-
statistics to test for weak identification of individual endogenous regressors. The AP first-
stage F-statistics indicate that a particular endogenous regressor is weakly identified if the null 
hypothesis is rejected.25 Table 5 reports that nearly all instrumental variables used are strong 
with F-test values above 16.38, with the exception of the instrumental variables for 1997, 
1998, 2002 and 2003, indicating for these years weak instrumental variables.  
Because the instrumental variables for some years have weak properties, we use 
only just-identified instruments as they are median-unbiased and not subject to the weak 
instrumental variable critique. Furthermore, following the suggestion of Angrist and Pischke 
(2009), we check the two-stage least squares (2SLS) results with estimates from Limited 
Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML), as the latter results are less biased. LIML can be 
seen as a “combinatory estimation” technique where the ordinary least square (OLS) and 
2SLS estimations are combined and the weights for the two estimations are determined by 
the data (see Angrist and Pischke, 2009, for further explanation). We use as instrument 
variables one-year lagged values of marginal costs and kernel-based heteroskedastic and 
autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) variance estimations. The bandwidth in the estimation is set 
at two periods, and the Newey-West kernel is applied. The results of 2SLS and LIML are very 
similar, in fact almost identical, and therefore we only present the results with LIML.26  
To assess the evolution of bank competition, we first estimate the yearly PE 
indicator, which is based on equation (6.1). Table 5 reports the results. The yearly PE 
indicators are significantly different from zero for most of the sample years, except for the 
1997-2000 period. Competition increased sharply during 2001-2003 and then declined up to 
2005. It then intensified again, followed by a slightly decreasing level of competition in 2007 
and 2008. In general, the development of the yearly PE indicator suggests that competitive 
conditions in Chinese loan markets improved, especially after WTO accession in 2001. 
Admittedly, the insignificant results for the early years in our sample could be caused by the 
small number of observations for those years, in which case the results could be influenced 
strongly by outliers. Therefore, we estimate the PE indicator for subsamples to avoid small-
sample bias.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                          
25. The Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value at 10% (maximal LIML size) is 16.38 (Stock and Yogo, 2005). 
26. Results with 2SLS are available upon request. 
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The subsamples are defined in the same way as in the previous sections, eg pre-
WTO (1996-2001) and post-WTO (2002-2008). We estimate one PE indicator for each 
subsample and test whether competition changed significantly after WTO accession. These 
point estimates can be interpreted as averages of yearly estimates over their respective 
sample periods, weighted by the number of observations in each year. A point estimate of the 
PE indicator for the whole sample 1996-2008 is provided as well. Estimations are based on 
the following equation: 
ln lnilt ilt iltTrend mc u        (6.3) 
where Trend is a time trend.27  
Table 6 reports the results for the subsample estimations. The Kleibergen-Paap rk 
LM statistics are significant at the 1% level for the whole sample and each subsample, 
rejecting the null hypothesis that the model is unidentified. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-
statistic for each sample is larger than 16.38, suggesting that the estimations do not suffer 
from weak identification. Both test statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. All PE indicators have the correct sign (negative) and are significant at the 1% 
level, except for the pre-WTO period. To test whether competitive conditions in Chinese loan 
markets experienced significant structural change after WTO accession, we performed a Chi-
squared distributed Wald test with one degree of freedom to determine whether the PE 
indicators are significantly different across various subsamples. The rejection of the null 
hypothesis (H0: pre-WTO PE indicator <= post-WTO PE indicator) indicates that the level of 
bank competition was significantly higher in the post-WTO period. 
                                                                          
27. Using year dummies instead of a time trend generates similar results for all estimations reported in this paper. 
Results are available upon request.  
 
Yearly PE Indicator 
Dependent variable: ln(Profits) Table 5 
   PE Indicator z-value AP chi
2(1) p-value AP F (1,433) 
1997 5.783    (0.44)    0.4866 0.46 
1998 –2.177    (–1.23)    0.1021 2.53 
1999 1.489    (0.56)    0.0000 31.78 
2000 0.147    (0.05)    0.0000 27.91 
2001 –4.250*** (–5.85)    0.0000 31.11 
2002 –5.497**  (–2.36)    0.0002 13.10 
2003 –6.327*** (–2.64)    0.0147 5.64 
2004 –4.092*** (–3.92)    0.0000 58.28 
2005 –1.352    (–1.45)    0.0000 67.26 
2006 –4.024*** (–4.17)    0.0000 20.73 
2007 –3.611*** (–5.36)    0.0000 89.77 
2008 –2.482*** (–4.12)    0.0000 28.15 
Constant 0.401    (0.23)        
Nr obs 457 
F 6.249 
Centered R2 0.131 
z-values in parenthesis; ** represents significance level of 5%, *** represent significance level of 1%. AP chi2 is the Angrist-Pischke (AP) 
first-stage chi-squared test. AP F is the Angrist-Pischke (AP) F-statistic, which can be compared to Stock-Yogo (2002) and (2005) critical 
values for Cragg-Donald F statistic with K1=1. The Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value at 10% maximal LIML size is 16.38. Year 
dummies are not reported to save space. 
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Finally, our estimates of the yearly PE indicators and of the PE indicators for the 
whole samples and subsamples (point estimates) are robust to different estimation methods 
and different specifications of the PE indicator. These robustness tests are presented in 
Appendix E, for an alternative definition of the PE indicator (E.4) and for an alternative 
calculation of marginal costs (E.5). The latter analysis shows that the slightly different 
calculation of marginal costs for the (elasticity-adjusted) Lerner index and the PE indicator 
does not drive the divergence between their results. 
6.3 Comparison of the various empirical measures 
The results for the various measures that we presented in the previous sections revealed 
significant differences in the evolution of competition and its level, for both the yearly and 
subsample estimates. The fact that different competition measures yield inconsistent results 
for the same banking market and country is well documented in the empirical banking 
literature, as discussed in Sections 1 and 2. At the same time, this finding may be especially 
relevant for relatively regulated markets such as Chinese loan markets. Hence, following 
Carbó Valverde et al. (2009), we formally test for the consistence of different competition 
measures by calculating pair-wise correlation coefficients. Since all competition measures 
except the H-statistic imply higher competition with a lower value, we multiply the H-statistic 
results by –1 to make comparison easier, so that now a higher value implies lower 
competition for all measures. The results of the pair-wise correlations are reported in Table 7. 
 
Point estimates PE indicator: Whole sample and subsamples 
Dependent variable: ln(Profits) Table 6 
  1996–2008 1996–2001 2002–2008 
PE Indicator –2.388*** –1.514 –3.570*** 
 (–5.78) (–1.43) (–7.74)    
Time Trend –0.0332 –0.519** 0.345*** 
 (–0.82) (–2.37) –4.71 
Constant –0.24 4.966** –8.050*** 
  (–0.19) (2.18) (–4.51)    
H0:prewto -postwto <=0(p-value) 3.61** (0.0288) 
Nr. Obs 457 87 370 
F 16.78 2.97 33.67 
Centered R2 0.089 0.141 0.18 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 211.4 30.98 130.8 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM (p-value) 62.00(0.0000) 13.94(0.0001) 44.22(0.0000)    
z-values in parenthesis; ** represents significance level of 5%, *** represents significance level of 1%. Since there is only one endogenous 
variable, we use Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F and Kleibergen-Paap rk LM tests to test weak identification and under-identification. The 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value at 10% maximal LIML size is 16.38. 
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Testing the pair-wise correlations of these measures of competition first reveals that 
the PE indicator is negatively correlated with the H-statistic and the traditional Lerner index 
(the latter not significant at 1%). This finding confirms that the former indicator yields 
diametrically opposed results to those from the latter two traditional measures. At the same 
time, the PE indicator is positively correlated with the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index. 
Second, in order to test whether the competition measures produce similar conclusions on 
the evolution of competition over time, we provide pair-wise correlation coefficients with time. 
A negative (positive) value indicates improved (worsened) competition over time. The PE 
indicator suggests improving competition across the sample years, while the other measures 
suggest the opposite, a result that is consistent with our results in the previous sections. 
6.4 Interpretation results PE indicator 
As we have argued above, the PE indicator is the most appropriate measure to assess 
competitive conditions in Chinese loan markets. This section provides an in-depth analysis of 
its results. Overall, we are generally well able to explain the specific development of this 
indicator over time, which strengthens our belief that it is superior to the Panzar-Rosse and 
Lerner approaches in the context of China. In fact, we find it rather difficult to offer plausible 
explanations for the results obtained with the latter two measures. 
The key to understanding why the results for the PE indicator are so different from 
those of more conventional competition indicators like the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic and the 
(elasticity-adjusted) Lerner index lies in the system of interest rate regulation in China. If 
interest regulation is binding, it can substantially bias the traditional measures but not RPD. 
We have proved this theoretically for the Lerner index in Section 4.3. In the case of the H-
statistic, we discuss this bias in Appendix A (A.3).  
Whether and to what extent interest regulation is binding is an empirical question 
which definitely requires more attention in the literature on measuring bank competition. The 
empirical literature on binding interest rate regulation in the context of China is rather small. 
However, the general consensus is that: a) the lending rate floor is considered to be non-
binding in practice (He and Wang, 2012; see Section 3.1); b) the deposit rate floor and ceiling 
are binding (Feyzioğlu, 2009; Ma et al., 2011; He and Wang, 2012;28 PBC, 2009; Yi, 2009); 
and c) the lending rate ceiling was most likely binding during the pre-WTO period (Yi, 2009). In 
this section, we argue that the bias in the H-statistic and Lerner index predominantly results 
                                                                          
28. He and Wang (2012, p. 34): “Using the regression results, we can then estimate the equilibrium interest rate by 
subtracting the effects of financial repression from the observed real interest rate: the equilibrium deposit rate in China 
was estimated at 4.7% in 2005. This estimated equilibrium deposit rate is significantly higher than the observed real 
deposit rate of 1.6% in 2005, which means that the deposit-rate ceiling must have been binding in China.” 
 
Pair-wise correlation coefficients Table 7 
  PE H Lerner 
Elasticity-adjusted 
Lerner 
PE 1    
H –0.1884* 1   
Lerner –0.0413 0.4154* 1  
Elasticity-adjusted 
Lerner 0.1433* 0.3522* 0.9321* 1 
TIME –0.4152* 0.2779* 0.7602* 0.5869* 
* represents significance level of 1%. 
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from binding interest rate regulation. The interest rate regulation discussed here is mainly the 
ceilings on deposit and lending rates, but similar analysis can be extended to the floors 
applied to these rates.  
Turning to the specific results we obtained in the PE indicator estimations, we find 
generally positive and insignificant values for the PE indicator for the early years of our 
sample, suggesting that during 1997-2000 a negative relationship between efficiency 
(marginal costs) and profits could not be established (see Section 6.2, Table 5). We are 
encouraged by this result, as one would expect that, during the years when Chinese banking 
markets were still heavily regulated, more efficient banks would not be more profitable, with 
competition being suppressed. In other words, there was no reward for being more 
competitive than one’s competitors. Actually, this finding reminds us of the results for 
Japanese loan markets during the 1990s in Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007 and 2011), when 
the PE indicator was positive (and significant). This could be related to the regulated “convoy 
system” in Japan where market shares were more or less guaranteed and competitive forces 
were largely absent. 
Subsequently, we start to find negative and highly significant values for the PE 
indicator for Chinese loan markets from 2001 onwards, indicating that, as loan markets 
became more competitive, more efficient banks started to generate more profits than less 
efficient banks. The PE indicator improved further until 2003, when it reached its lowest value 
of –6.3 (eg highest level of competition). From an international perspective, this value is 
comparable to the most competitive yearly results we obtained for several mature economies 
(Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2007 and 2011). 
Then, after 2003, we find a gradual decline in competition in Chinese loan markets 
(but still with negative and, except for one year, highly significant results), which was the most 
notable in 2004, 2007 and 2008. We believe that various policy measures and a certain 
degree of re-regulation may be responsible for this pattern of slightly declining competition. In 
general, there is evidence that, for both mature and emerging market economies, financial 
deregulation has often been intertwined with concomitant prudential re-regulation (Zhao et al., 
2010). This seems also to have occurred to a certain extent in China. In 2004, the CBRC 
adopted new capital adequacy requirements, including the requirement to fully provision their 
non-performing loans and maintain at least 8% of aggregate capital adequacy, that banks 
should meet by 2007 (Podpiera, 2006). Further in 2004, the CBRC strengthened other parts 
of its regulatory policies, including its on-site examinations and monitoring of large exposures, 
and introduced risk-based supervision for the CCBs. Regulation was tightened regarding 
non-performing loans (NPLs), with a view to reducing banks’ NPL ratios (Liu, 2009). The 
combined impact of these measures may have affected competitive conditions in Chinese 
loan markets. In addition, the PBC, worried by a possible overheating of the Chinese 
economy, re-introduced credit quotas in the fall of 2007 that aimed to mitigate bank lending 
growth. As formulated by Fukumoto et al. (2010, p. 3): “The newly introduced credit limits 
were similar to the credit plan which had existed until 1998 in the sense that both of these 
measures set rigorous constraints on the growth of bank lending. The growth of bank lending 
started to slow down once credit limits were implemented.” These lending restrictions were 
kept in place until the fall of 2008 and can be characterised as a major step of re-regulation, 
as they re-instated elements of the old credit plan system. It may be regarded that this policy 
move had a detrimental impact on bank competition in China, as it frustrated commercially 
oriented lending decisions and disincentivised competition. 
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The element of re-regulation is picked up nicely by the financial repression index 
developed for China in Huang and Wang (2011) (see Figure 3, left-hand panel). It is based on 
six financial repression variables, including two interest rates, two loan market share variables, 
reserve requirements and capital account controls. During the years of our sample – 1996-
2008 – the index declines, suggesting less financial repression for all years except for 2004, 
2007 and 2008, when it increases. After its first rise in 2004, indicating stronger financial 
repression, it fell to its lowest level ever in 2006, before strongly increasing in 2007, followed 
by a further pick-up in 2008. The yearly results of the PE indicator, which are depicted for 
illustrative purposes in Figure 3 (left-hand panel), closely follow the pattern of the financial 
repression index. The generally increasing re-regulation in the latter part of our sample may be 
reflected in the rather sharply increasing deposits to loans ratio from 2004 onwards (Figure 3, 
right-hand panel). Possibly, tightened loan controls and other regulatory steps forced banks 
to reduce the growth of their loans relative to that of their deposits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given the strong similarity between the pattern of the PE indicator and the financial 
repression index, we are interested in how this relation looks for other financial liberalisation 
indices. To this end, we employ two additional indicators of financial reform: the overall 
financial liberalisation and interest rate liberalisation indices developed by Abiad et al. (2010). 
Their values are shown in Appendix D, Table D.1. The former index measures the overall 
degree of financial liberalisation, with values ranging from 0 to 1, with a higher value indicating 
a more liberalised financial system. The latter index, which takes the values 0, 1, 2 or 3, 
indicates fully repressed, partially repressed, partially liberalised and fully liberalised interest 
rates, respectively.  
In order to provide a more comprehensive analysis, we calculate the pair-wise 
correlation coefficients between the three indices of financial reform and the same four 
measures of competition that we used in Section 6.3. 
Again, we multiply the H-statistic results by –1 to make comparison of the 
correlations easier. The results are reported in Table 8. Should financial reform promote 
competition, one would expect positive correlations between the financial repression index 
and the competition measures. This is because both the index and the measures show 
improved conditions with lower values and vice versa. In contrast, one would expect negative 
correlations between the two other financial liberalisation indices and the competition 
 
Interpretation results PE indicator Figure 3
Panel A: PE indicator and FREP  Panel B: Deposit-to-loan ratio (in %) 
 
FREP = Financial repression index.  
Sources: Authors’ own calculations. We are grateful to Yiping Huang and Xun Wang for sharing the values of FREP index with us. 
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measures if financial reform promotes competition. Namely, the two indices indicate a more 
liberalised financial system with higher values, while the indicators of competition suggest 
more competition with lower values. Since financial reform may affect banking behaviour with 
a time lag, we use one-period lagged values of the three indices.29  
In case a more liberalised financial system is associated with more intense 
competition, the correlations of the PE indicator show the expected sign with all three indices 
(positive for the financial repression index and negative for the two others). The correlations 
are also highly significant at the 1% level. In contrast, the correlations of the other measures 
(ie the H-statistic and the Lerner indices) that are significant all have the opposite sign, 
suggesting that increased liberalisation is associated with weaker competition.  
Although we did not formally test the impact of financial reform on competition in 
Chinese loan markets, the pair-wise correlation coefficients that we find for the PE indicator, 
all associating more reform with more competition, tend to bolster our confidence in it. The 
empirical literature on the relationship between financial reform and competition is not always 
conclusive, but generally its results for emerging market economies have shown a beneficial 
link between the two (see Section 2). That we find this for China is in our view encouraging.  
Finally, a number of structural developments in the Chinese financial system should 
support increasing competition in Chinese banking. First, the market share of the four SOCBs 
in bank lending has declined steadily over the past decade. This should have contributed to 
improving competition. Second, China has experienced a steady rise of the shadow banking 
system, which should have increased competition in bank loan markets, as banks have to 
compete for a smaller share of total credit intermediation in China. Third, Chinese banks have 
introduced personal incentive-driven remuneration packages, which link the remuneration of 
individual loan officers much more to their actual performance. This should have contributed 
to competition in Chinese loan markets as well. 
                                                                          
29. We also employed the current values of the financial reform indices to account for the possibility that banks may 
anticipate financial reform measures and adjust their competitive strategies accordingly. The results are similar to the 
ones we report here.   
Pair-wise correlation coefficients with financial reform indices Table 8 
  PE H Lerner 
Elasticity-adjusted 
Lerner 
FREP 0.6560* –0.2159* –0.5794* –0.3104* 
Fin_Lib Index –0.4223* 0.2689* 0.5015* –0.055 
Int_Lib Index –0.2206* 0.4175* 0.7917* 0.3285* 
* represents significance level of 1%. FREP is the financial repression index as reported in Huang and Wang (2011). Fin_Lib Index 
and Int_Lib_Index represent financial liberalization index and interest rate liberalization index, respectively. The values of the 
indices are reported in Appendix D, Table D.1. 
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7 Conclusions 
This paper investigates the evolution of competition in Chinese loan markets. We believe that 
this investigation makes sense, as after 30 years of financial reform, China’s banks have 
begun to behave more like commercial banks in mature economies (Firth et al., 2009; Herd et 
al., 2010; IMF, 2011). The impact of financial reform on bank competition has been 
investigated extensively for many countries, and for most mature and emerging economies 
empirical studies suggest that it promoted bank competition. 
However, some earlier studies that adopted conventional approaches to measure 
competition concluded that bank competition in China declined during the past decade, 
despite these reforms. In this paper, we compare the results obtained from conventional 
indicators such as the Lerner index and Panzar-Rosse H-statistic with those estimated using 
the relatively new Profit Elasticity (PE) approach. We argue that traditional measures of 
competition fail to measure competition in the Chinese banking sector properly, and we 
provide arguments – both theoretically and empirically – to support this.  
Using balance sheet information for a large sample of banks operating in China 
during 1996-2008, we show that competition actually increased in the past decade when the 
PE measure introduced by Boone et al. (2007) and Boone (2008) is used as indicator of 
competition. We find that the period after China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 was 
characterised by significantly more competitive loan markets than before. This stands in 
contrast to the results that we obtain by calculating the conventional and elasticity-adjusted 
Lerner indices and the H-statistic. We doubt these findings, as they may be distorted by 
various factors, including restrictions on market shares and interest rates. 
This study yields two major insights. First, the theoretical foundation of the PE 
indicator, which is the RPD model, is not biased due to interest rate regulation. This makes 
the PE indicator a much better measure to gauge competition in Chinese loan markets than 
conventional approaches. This is a very general insight that can be useful for investigations of 
competitive conditions in banking markets in countries where binding regulation of interest 
rates is a distinctive characteristic. Second, applying this unbiased competition indicator to 
Chinese loan markets shows that financial reform indeed has contributed to significant 
improvements in competition. This result is much in line with those obtained for other 
emerging economies. Again, we find contradictory results for the conventional measures. 
Moreover, our results for both the PE indicator and the other measures are robust for a large 
number of alternative specifications and estimation methods.  
All in all, our analysis suggests that bank lending markets in China have been more 
competitive than previously assumed. It may also provide an answer to questions raised in 
other research on this issue. For example, Fungáčová et al. (2012) use the Lerner index and 
find results similar to ours for the same index, indicating that bank competition in China 
declined over time. They go on to note that “at first glance, it is somewhat remarkable that 
China’s accession to WTO has not led to greater competition in the banking industry”. As we 
have argued in this paper, this may not be that remarkable after all. It may be the case that 
competition in the Chinese banking system has not been assessed with the proper method. 
Of course, further work is definitely needed to substantiate this claim. For example, it would 
be interesting to see how the results that we report here compare with those for other 
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banking systems of comparable structure and stage of development to China’s. Moreover, 
given the strong differences in regional economic and financial development across China, 
the PE indicator and conventional measures could be estimated for the regional banking 
market in China. For those that de facto operate under more liberalised conditions, the 
differences between the PE indicator and other measures may be much smaller, for example 
when compared with those for much less developed and de facto more regulated regions.  
More generally, our findings for China indicate that the bank competition literature 
may wish to focus more explicitly on the potential biases in competition measures that result 
from the existence of interest rate and other regulations. Regarding the former, empirical work 
to assess whether, and to what extent, interest rate regulation is binding is crucial to 
validating whether conventional measures of competition may obtain unbiased results. 
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Appendix: Measuring bank competition in China: a comparison of new versus 
conventional approaches applied to loan markets 
Appendix A. Panzar-Rosse H-statistic 
 
A.1.  MODEL 
The so-called H-statistic developed by Panzar and Rosse has been employed in a small 
number of empirical studies on bank competition in China (Yuan, 2006; Fu, 2009).30 The H-
statistic is defined as the sum of the elasticities of a bank’s total revenue with respect to that 
bank’s input prices (Rosse and Panzar, 1977; Panzar and Rosse, 1987). Under monopoly, 
the revenues of the banks in question are independent of the decisions made by their actual 
or potential rivals. Panzar and Rosse proved that in this situation an increase in input prices 
will increase marginal costs, reduce equilibrium output and subsequently reduce revenues. 
Therefore, in this situation the H-statistic should be smaller than or equal to zero. In contrast, 
in the models of monopolistic competition and perfect competition, the revenue function of 
individual banks depends upon the decisions made by its actual or potential rivals (Bikker and 
Haaf, 2002). Under monopolistic competition, the change in input price is greater than the 
change in revenue and the H-statistic should lie between 0 and 1. Finally, under perfect 
competition, the H-statistic is equal to one because increases in input prices are passed on to 
output prices (in our case the lending rate). Higher input prices raise both marginal and 
average costs without, under certain assumptions, changing the optimal output of any 
individual bank. As some banks exit the market, the demand facing the remaining banks will 
increase, resulting in higher output prices and revenues equivalent to the rise in costs. Overall, 
a larger H-statistic indicates a higher degree of competition.  
Following Bikker and Haaf (2002), we estimate the H-statistic based on the following 
revenue equation: 
         
     
1
2 3 4 5 1... 1
ln / ln ln ln ln _
ln _ ln _ ln _ _
it it it it it it
h
it it it it h H h i it
II TA AFR PPE PCE LNS TA
ONEA TA DPS F EQ TA OI II d error
    
     
    
        (A.1) 
The dependent variable ln(llit / TAit) is the logarithm of the ratio of interest income to 
total assets.31 Hence, we employ the so-called scaled version of the Panzar-Rosse model, in 
order to be able to compare our results with those of Yuan (2006) and Fu (2009). We use the 
ratio of interest expenses to total funding as a proxy for the average funding rate (AFR). The 
ratio of personnel expenses to total assets is adopted as a proxy for the wage rate or price of 
personnel expenditure (PPE). Furthermore, the ratio of non-interest expenses to fixed assets 
is used as a proxy for the price of capital expenditure (PCE). The H-statistic, or the sum of the 
elasticities of a bank’s total revenue with respect to that bank’s input prices, is then defined 
as H=++. 
                                                                          
30. Bikker et al. (2007) and Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) include China in Panzar-Rosse based investigations of bank 
competition in large country samples as well.  
31. Bikker et al. (2007) and Bikker et al. (2012) demonstrate that taking interest income as share of total assets, or the 
inclusion of scale variables as explanatory variables, may lead to overestimate competition and distorted tests results. 
Instead, they suggest using unscaled variables, ie using interest income, as the dependent variable. However, we use 
the scaled version of the H-statistic in order to be able to compare our results with those of Yuan (2006) and Fu (2009). 
As a robustness check, we also have estimated unscaled H-statistic. For more details see Appendix E (E.1).  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 51 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1404 
We follow the standard approach to include several bank specific variables as control 
variables to capture bank differences in risk, size and business structure. As the H-statistic 
assesses market structure by evaluating the relationship between costs and revenues, bank-
specific characteristics need to be controlled for. We take the following variables into account: 
The ratio of loans to total assets (LNS_TA); the ratio of other non-earning assets to total 
assets (ONEA_TA) reflects the composition of assets; the ratio of customer deposits to the 
sum of customer deposits and short-term funding (DPS_F) captures the features of the 
funding mix; the ratio of equity to total assets (EQ_TA) is employed to reflect risk; the ratio of 
other income to interest income (OI_II) proxies the specific business structure. The variable dih 
is the bank type dummy. As we have four types of banks in our sample (SOCB, JSCB, CCB 
and FOREIGN), we drop the CCB dummy to avoid over identification. The respective data are 
summarised in Table 3.   
The coefficient for LNS_TA is expected to be positive, as more lending potentially 
generates more interest income. The coefficient for ONEA_TA may be negative, as a higher 
ratio may be associated with lower interest income. OI_II is likely to have a negative 
coefficient, because generating other income might come at the expenses of interest income. 
For the signs of the coefficients for the other control variables, no prior expectations are 
offered by theory.     
An important limitation of the H-statistic is that the market must be in long-run 
equilibrium, ie the return on total assets (ROA) should not be significantly correlated with input 
prices. The underlying motivation is that competitive markets will equalise the risk-adjusted 
rates of return across firms to such an extent that, in equilibrium, their correlation with input 
prices will be zero (Gutiérrez de Rozas, 2007). As is standard in the literature, we test the 
long-run equilibrium condition based on a regression in which the dependent variable is 
ln(ROA), while the independent variables are the same as in Equation (A.1): 
         
     
1
2 3 4 5 1... 1
ln ln ln ln ln _
ln _ ln _ ln _ _
it it it it it
h
it it it it h H h i it
ROA AFR PPE PCE LNS TA
ONEA TA DPS F EQ TA OI II d error
    
     
    
         (A.2) 
where ROA is defined as net income over total assets. With this specification, 
E=++ =0 indicates long-run equilibrium, while E<0 represents disequilibrium. 
A.2.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS PANZAR-ROSSE H-STATISTIC 
Estimations are carried out with recursive least squares.32 This approach does not impose 
any parametric structure on the evolution of the H-statistic and has the advantage of allowing 
for the assessment of bank competition for various time windows in our sample. We do not 
employ the commonly used yearly estimation of the H-statistic, as in Fu (2009) and Yuan 
(2006), because the test statistics based on a small number of banks in the early years of our 
sample might not be reliable. Another advantage of recursive least squares is that this 
approach can avoid the erratic pattern of the H-statistic which is often obtained with yearly 
estimations (Bikker and Spierdijk, 2008). We estimate Equation (A.1) recursively, starting with 
a window of two years and expanding the sample by one year at a time. In total we obtain 12 
estimation windows. The results are summarised in Table A.1, Panel A. To ensure standard 
errors and statistics that are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, kernel-
                                                                          
32. Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) employ a parametric approach by incorporating time variant coefficients in the revenue 
equation. We use this approach as one of the robustness tests in Appendix E (E.2). We also tested 3-year rolling-
window regressions and found similar results to recursive least squares. Results are available upon request.   
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based heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) variance estimations are 
employed. The long-run equilibrium condition tests are provided for each time window, which 
are summarised in Panel B of Table A.1. To save space, the coefficients of the control 
variables are not reported. Nevertheless, the signs of the coefficients of the control variables 
confirm our prior expectations.33  
The estimated H-statistic show a slightly increasing level of bank competition for the 
early time windows, but with an increasing time span, bank competition generally follows a 
declining pattern. This result is rather similar to those obtained by Yuan (2006) and Fu (2009). 
However, it should be noted that the differences between the H-statistic across all time 
windows are not statistically different. Wald F-tests on the sum of the input price elasticities 
reject both H=1 (perfect competition) and H=0 (monopoly), indicating that all time windows 
can be characterised by monopolistic competition. Long-run equilibrium condition tests are 
rejected for all time windows except for one.  
To assess whether bank competition experienced structural changes, we estimate 
H-statistic for the whole sample and two subsamples. The break year for the subsamples is 
2001, the year of WTO accession, resulting in the pre-WTO period 1996-2001 and post-WTO 
period 2002-2008.34 The results for the H-statistic are reported in Table A.2, while the long-
run market equilibrium condition tests for the whole sample and sub-samples are reported in 
Table A.3. The H-statistics for each sub-sample and for the whole sample again suggest that 
Chinese banking markets were in a state of monopolistic competition. When comparing the 
H-statistic for each subsample, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that they are equal 
across the subsamples for any conventional significance level, suggesting no significant 
structural change. Table A.3 shows that the long-run equilibrium condition (E=0) is rejected 
for the whole sample period and both subsample periods. This is likely to be related to the 
ongoing process of financial reform in China, which makes it unlikely that the banks have fully 
adjusted to market conditions. Hence, inferring competitive conditions from these results for 
China are likely to be biased.35  
To conclude, using similar specifications as Yuan (2006) and Fu (2009), we find that 
the market structure indicated by our results is that of monopolistic competition. Moreover, 
the level of competition does not change significantly across time. Finally, it should be noted 
that the long-run equilibrium condition underlying the Panzar-Rosse model generally is not 
satisfied.36 
A.3.  BIAS PANZAR-ROSSE H-STATISTIC DUE TO INTEREST RATE REGULATION 
Feyzioğlu et al. (2009) and Bikker et al. (2007) indicate that the H-statistic probably picks up 
the co-movement of regulated deposit and lending rates in China. So, instead of measuring 
the degree of pass-through of input prices to output prices that would measure the degree of 
competition in a liberalised market, it measures the degree in which the regulator sets deposit 
and lending rates jointly. The H-statistic may be biased upwards due to the high correlation 
                                                                          
33. Table A.2 reports the coefficients of the various control variables. The positive sign for LNS_TA and the negative 
signs for ONEA_TA and OI_II confirm our prior expectations.  
34. The selection of 2001 as break year in the dataset is supported by formal structural break tests. 
35. To test for monopolistic or perfect competition, it is necessary for the observations to be generated in long-run 
equilibrium (Panzar-Rosse, 1987). This equilibrium may not have been achieved yet in transitional economies, doubting 
its usefulness to assess competition in these markets (Shaffer, 1994; Northcott, 2004). 
36. We demonstrate in Appendix E (E.1) by using the unscaled version of the H-statistic, which is theoretically more 
sound than the scaled version (see Bikker et al., 2007, and Bikker et al., 2012), that the market structure for the pre-
WTO period featured perfect competition and that for the post-WTO period monopolistic competition. 
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between the ceilings on deposit and loan rates, which may have been especially relevant for 
the earlier sample years when interest rate deregulation had hardly started. The high values of 
the H-statistic for the pre-WTO period reported in previous studies (Yuan, 2006; Fu, 2009) 
and in our own estimates in the previous section likely are driven by this effect. The ceiling on 
the lending rate was abolished in 2004, which may have reduced the impact of this bias in 
subsequent years. This conclusion is supported by the findings reported in Table A.2, where 
the coefficient of the average funding rate (AFR) is much higher in the pre-WTO period, while 
dropping considerably later on when the lending rate ceiling was abolished.     
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H-statistic and long-run equilibrium condition: Recursive least squares Table A.1 
Panel A: H-Statistic 
  ln(AFR) ln(PPE) ln(PCE) H 
H0: H=1 
chi2(1) 
H0: H=0 
chi2(1) Nr.obs F Adj R2 
1996–1997 0.717*** 0.0736**  –0.0647*  0.7254 7.77*** 54.24*** 25 113.09 0.836 
1996–1998 0.778*** 0.0652** –0.0588* 0.7840 7.48*** 98.52*** 39 66.13 0.864 
1996–1999 0.715*** 0.0771**  –0.0493 0.7424 20.64*** 
171.51**
* 60 64.37 0.821 
1996–2000 0.689*** 
0.0828**
* –0.026 0.7461 26.48*** 
228.61**
* 84 92.34 0.852 
1996–2001 0.650*** 
0.0986**
* –0.024 0.7246 38.79*** 
268.57**
* 112 74.17 0.852 
1996–2002 0.550*** 0.113*** 0.00124 0.6642 57.99*** 
226.82**
* 144 44.51 0.858 
1996–2003 0.535*** 0.136*** 0.0113 0.6818 53.43*** 
245.21**
* 184 51.39 0.837 
1996–2004 0.517*** 0.129*** 0.0303 0.6757 52.01*** 225.9*** 223 51.58 0.826 
1996–2005 0.512*** 0.134*** 0.0164 0.6627 60.64*** 
234.14**
* 277 62.03 0.823 
1996–2006 0.507*** 0.120*** 0.0097 0.6364 81.79*** 
250.59**
* 350 74.11 0.799 
1996–2007 0.522*** 0.131*** 0.0121 0.6643 74.54*** 291.9*** 432 86.4 0.795 
1996–2008 0.532*** 
 
0.126*** 0.0183 0.6765 82.5*** 
360.86**
* 493 96.5 0.777 
Panel B: Long-run equilibrium condition test 
  ln(AFR) ln(PPE) ln(PCE) H 
H0: E=1 
chi2(1) 
Equilibri
um Nr.obs F Adj R2 
1996–1997 –0.0189 –0.0589 –0.0948 –0.1726 0.31 A 24 13.17 0.528 
1996–1998 1.186*** –0.164 –0.163 0.8590 6.14** R 38 16.72 0.585 
1996–1999 0.852*** –0.121 –0.128 0.6026 9.71*** R 59 9.904 0.364 
1996–2000 0.795*** –0.0983 –0.0735 0.6232 15.83*** R 83 11.82 0.389 
1996–2001 0.566*** –0.0499 0.0414 0.5573 15.83*** R 111 8.406 0.345 
1996–2002 0.341*** 0.00301 0.112 0.4556 10.92*** R 141 7.702 0.307 
1996–2003 0.362*** –0.0416 0.0621 0.3825 7.25*** R 181 6.391 0.263 
1996–2004 0.311*** –0.0413 0.0174 0.2871 4.00** R 219 4.969 0.203 
1996–2005 0.283*** –0.0695 0.0494 0.2625 3.9** R 273 5.17 0.167 
1996–2006 0.235*** –0.0917 0.0616 0.2049 2.74* R 345 5.86 0.145 
1996–2007 0.267*** –0.0789 0.131** 0.3193 7.34*** R 427 7.847 0.167 
1996–2008 0.286*** –0.05  0.155** 0.3907 14.9*** R 486 9.661 0.182 
* represents significance level of 10%, ** represent significance level of 5%, *** represent significance level of 1%. A and R represent 
“Accepting” and “Rejecting” the null hypothesis that E=0 (equilibrium) at a 10% significance level. 
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H-statistic point estimates: Whole sample and subsamples Table A.2 
 1996–2008 1996–2001 2002–2008 
ln(AFR) 0.532*** (24.63) 0.650***  (20.09)  0.537*** (21.81) 
ln(PPE) 0.126*** (4.89) 0.0986*** (3.85) 0.145*** (4.03) 
ln(PCE) 0.0183 (1.27) –0.024 (-0.96) 0.0149 (0.92)  
lnLNS_TA 0.0920* (1.68) 0.0293 (0.60) 0.0905 (1.41) 
LnONEA_TA –0.0191*** (–3.75)  –0.0545*** (-4.31) -0.0140*** (-2.62) 
lnDPS_F 0.117*** (2.61) –0.0378 (-1.03) 0.179*** (3.88) 
lnEQ_TA 0.0846*** (3.62) 0.120*** (3.55) 0.0841*** (3.08) 
lnOI_II –0.0737*** (–9.56) –0.0736*** (-5.56) -0.0760*** (-8.48) 
SOCB –0.0779*** (–2.83) –0.100** (-1.98) -0.0485 (-1.59) 
JSCB –0.0137 (–0.58) 0.0870** (2.10) -0.0595* (-1.94) 
FOREIGN –0.204*** (–4.29)  –0.402*** (-3.59) -0.163*** (-3.34) 
Constant –0.361** (–2.23)  –0.252 (-1.30) -0.207  (-0.99) 
H-statistic 0.6765 0.7246 0.6974 
H0: H=0 chi2(1) 360.86*** 268.57*** 226.37*** 
H0: H=1 chi2(1) 82.50*** 38.79*** 42.63*** 
Hprewto=Hpostwto chi
2(1)=0.22 p–value=0.6357 
Nr. Obs 493 112 381 
F 96.50*** 74.17*** 83.00*** 
Adj R2 0.777 0.852 0.768 
z-values in parenthesis; * represents significance level of 10%, ** represents significance level of 5%,  
*** represents significance level of 1% 
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Long-run equilibrium condition: Whole sample and subsamples 
Dependent variable: lnROA Table A.3 
 1996–2008 1996–2001 2002–2008 
ln(AFR) 0.286*** (3.42) 0.566***  (3.25)  0.341*** (3.70)  
ln(PPE) –0.05 (–0.61) –0.0499 (–0.36) –0.0621 (–0.62) 
ln(PCE) 0.155** (2.57) 0.0414 (0.38) 0.119** (1.98) 
lnLNS_TA –0.137 (–0.76) –0.875* (–1.67) –0.00647 (–0.03) 
LnONEA_TA –0.111*** (–5.35) –0.165*** (–2.83) –0.107*** (–4.98) 
lnDPS_F 0.142 (1.01) –0.113 (–0.77) 0.403*** (3.07) 
lnEQ_TA 0.355*** (4.25)  0.473*** (2.65) 0.355*** (3.77) 
lnOI_II –0.00345 (–0.13) –0.0633 (–1.47) –0.00194 (–0.07) 
SOCB –0.211* (–1.76) –0.614** (–2.41) 0.0405 (0.36)  
JSCB –0.0959 (–1.08) 0.0739 (0.43) –0.234**   (–1.98)   
FOREIGN –0.486*** (–2.64)  –1.676*** (–2.82) –0.21  (–1.41)  
Constant –3.155*** (–5.62) –2.802*** (–2.94) –2.880*** (–4.24) 
H0: E=0 chi2(1) 14.90*** 15.83*** 10.22*** 
Nr obs 486 111 375 
F 9.661*** 8.406*** 8.950*** 
Adj R2 0.182 0.345 0.208 
z-values in parenthesis; * represents significance level of 10%, ** represents significance level of 5%, *** represents significance level of 
1%. 
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Appendix B. Underlying estimations elasticity-adjusted Lerner index 
 
 
  Yearly estimates Subsample estimates 
Panel A:Cost Equation 
 Coefficient z-value Coefficient z-value 
ln(securities) -0.505*** (-2.76)    -0.285    (-1.51)    
(ln(securities))² 0.0300*** (3.57)    0.0314*** (3.61)    
ln(other services) 0.973*** (5.23)    0.831*** (4.37)    
(ln(other services))² 0.0426*** (4.05)    0.0288*** (2.74)    
ln(wage)-ln(other expenses) 1.270*** (4.51)    1.447*** (5.20)    
(ln(wage) –ln(other expenses))² 0.151*** (5.36)    0.150*** (5.41)    
ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses) 0.460**  (2.26)    0.285    (1.38)    
(ln(funding rate) –ln(other expenses))² 0.197*** (4.94)    0.189*** (4.94)    
(ln(wage) –ln(other expenses))*(ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses)) -0.274*** (-4.96)    -0.268*** (-5.05)    
ln(securities) * ln(other services) -0.0265    (-1.59)    -0.0220    (-1.32)    
ln(securities)*(ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses)) 0.0528**  (2.29)    0.0415*   (1.84)    
ln(securities)*(ln(wage)-ln(other expenses)) -0.164*** (-5.31)    -0.133*** (-4.25)    
ln(other services)*(ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses)) -0.00508    (-0.21)    -0.0306    (-1.32)    
ln(other services) *(ln(wage)-ln(other expenses)) 0.147*** (4.66)    0.161*** (5.19)    
ln(equity/assets) -0.0116    (-0.06)    0.0321    (0.17)    
(ln(eqauity/asset))² -0.00769    (-0.23)    0.000250    (0.01)    
SOCB 0.398*** (3.11)    0.371*** (3.04)    
JSCB 0.332*** (4.37)    0.304*** (4.51)    
CCB 0.194*** (3.25)    0.189*** (3.44)    
constant 4.054*** (4.17)    4.273*** (4.42)    
Panel B:Supply Equation 
ln(loans) 0.864*** (6.39)    0.724*** (4.75)    
(ln(loans))² 0.0263**  (2.52)    0.0298**  (2.54)    
ln(loans) * ln(securities) -0.0370**  (-2.35)    -0.0522*** (-3.06)    
ln(loans) * ln(other services) -0.0432*** (-3.26)    -0.0226    (-1.55)    
ln(loans)*(ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses)) -0.0366*   (-1.69)    0.00182    (0.08)    
ln(loans)*(ln(wage)-ln(other expenses)) 0.0374    (1.54)    -0.0135    (-0.52)    
1997 0.0616*** (9.17)      
1998 0.0449*** (7.89)      
1999 0.0294*** (5.89)      
2000 0.0208*** (4.84)      
2001 0.0191*** (4.66)      
2002 0.0151*** (4.19)      
2003 0.0167*** (4.84)      
2004 0.0196*** (5.96)      
2005 0.0227*** (7.39)      
2006 0.0255*** (9.18)      
2007 0.0359*** (13.99)      
2008 0.0415*** (13.18)      
1996-2001   0.0287*** (9.38)    
2002-2008     0.0269*** (14.12)    
Number of observations:  453 453 
z-values in parenthesis; * p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Time dummies in cost equation not shown to save space. 
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Chart B.1: Marginal costs and traditional and elasticity-adjusted Lerner indices 
 
MCe and MCl are the average marginal costs used in the calculation of the elasticity-adjusted Lerner and traditional 
Lerner indices, respectively. The dotted line in the right panel represents 95% confidence interval of traditional Lerner 
index.  
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Appendix C. Estimation translog cost functions (TCF) for PE indicator 
 
In order to be able to calculate marginal costs, we estimate, for each bank group, a translog 
cost function (TCF) using individual bank observations. This is done by allowing for bank type 
dummies dih to interact with the independent variables in the TCF, resulting in the following 
form: 
 0 1,..., 1,..., 1,...,1,..., 1 ln lnln lnh hit t t j K jh i ijt j K k K hjkh i ijt it kt iT tє d x xc d d x                (C.1) 
where the dependent variable chit reflects the production costs of bank i (i= 1,…, N) 
in year t (t = 1,…, T). The sub-index h (h = 1,…, H) refers to the type category of the bank 
(state owned banks, joint-stock banks, city commercial banks, foreign banks). The variable dhi 
is a bank type dummy variable, which is 1 if bank i is of type h and otherwise zero. Another 
dummy variable is dt, which is 1 in year t and otherwise zero. The coefficients αh, δjh and ϵjkh, 
all vary with h, the bank type. The parameters γt are the coefficients of the time dummies and 
νit is the error term. The explanatory variables xikt follow the same interpretation as in Section 
4.1.1. The two standard properties of TCF, linear homogeneity in input prices and cost-
exhaustion, hold for each bank type h. Namely, Equation (C.2) holds for each bank type h:  
1, 2, 31 2 , ,1 ,2 ,3 30 for 1,2,3, and 0 for 4, ...1, ,j j j k k kє є є j є є є k K              (C.2) 
The marginal costs of output category j = l (of loans) for bank i of category h in year t, 
mchilt are defined as: 
  ln lnh h h hilt it ilt it ilt it iltmc c x c x c x       (C.3) 
The term ∂lnchit/∂lnxilt is the first derivative of Equation (C.1) of costs to loans. We use 
the marginal costs of the output component ‘loans’ only (and not for the other K1 
components) as we investigate the loan markets. We estimate a separate translog cost 
function for each bank category (SOCB, JSCB, CCB and FOREIGN), allowing for differences 
in the production structure across bank types. This leads to the following equation of the 
marginal costs for output category loans (l) for bank i in category h during year t:  
 1 1,..., ; 11 ln l2 nlh ilth h hi k K k l khlt it i h it tl ikєmc s є xc x d       (C.4) 
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Estimate translog cost function by bank type Table C.1 
 SOCB JSCB CCB FOREIGN 
Dependent variable: ln(costs)-ln(other expenses)
Outputs 
ln(loans) 0.768**  (2.23)   1.332*** (5.15)   1.174*** (8.91)    1.759*** (17.22)   
(ln(loans))² –0.0743** (–2.01)   –0.00285   (–0.07)   0.0595*** (4.11)    –0.0263**  (–2.41)   
ln(securities) 0.265   (0.70)   –0.162   (–0.61)   –0.130   (–0.98)    0.0839    (0.96)   
(ln(securities))² 0.0950*** (4.73)   0.0143   (0.53)   0.0486*** (5.24)    –0.0201*** (–3.81)   
ln(other services) 0.945*** (4.76)   –0.411*** (–3.38)   0.142*  (1.82)    –0.0896   (–0.91)   
(ln(other services))² 0.0144*** (4.21)   –0.00469   (–0.90)   0.00641*  (1.70)    –0.0371*** (–2.90)   
Input prices 
ln(wage)-ln(other expenses) 2.907*** (4.78)   –0.698*** (–5.37)   0.352**  (2.04)    1.896*** (13.39)   
ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses) 0.739**  (2.15)   0.966*** (3.76)   –0.0135   (–0.08)    –1.179*** (–9.83)   
(ln(wage) –ln(other expenses))² –0.364*** (–8.82)   –0.00712   (–0.60)   0.0872*** (4.08)    0.111*** (5.81)   
(ln(funding rate) –ln(other 
expenses))² –0.0439*** (–3.11)   0.0937*** (3.79)   0.0539*** (2.69)    0.106*** (8.19)   
Cross-products between input prices 
(ln(wage) –ln(other 
expenses))*(ln(funding rate)-ln(other 
expenses)) 0.0831*** (2.82)   –0.0782*** (–3.00)   –0.128*** (–3.50)    –0.225*** (–7.45)   
Cross-products between outputs 
ln(loans) * ln(securities) –0.0247   (–0.47)   –0.0163   (–0.25)   –0.0947*** (–4.52)    –0.0467*** (–4.06)   
ln(loans) * ln(other services) –0.115*** (–5.40)   0.0454*  (1.91)   –0.0269** (–2.17)    –0.00174   (–0.12)   
ln(securities) * ln(other services) –0.00459   (–0.31)   –0.0176   (–0.97)   0.0122   (0.96)    0.0810*** (5.53)   
Cross-products between outputs and input prices
ln(loans)*(ln(funding rate)-ln(other 
expenses)) –0.0784** (–2.30)   –0.00700   (–0.15)   0.0481*  (1.93)    0.216*** (9.49)   
ln(loans)*(ln(wage)-ln(other 
expenses)) –0.745*** (–10.57)   0.123*** (5.19)   0.0975*** (3.80)    –0.130*** (–4.88)   
ln(securities)*(ln(funding rate)-
ln(other expenses)) 0.111*** (4.26)   0.0174   (0.46)   –0.0177   (–0.99)    0.0360**  (2.18)   
ln(securities)*(ln(wage)-ln(other 
expenses)) 0.472*** (12.95)   –0.0769*** (–3.06)   –0.0632*** (–3.21)    –0.0811*** (–3.98)   
ln(other services)*(ln(funding rate)-
ln(other expenses)) –0.0328** (–2.34)   –0.0119   (–0.60)   0.0222** (2.17)    –0.198*** (–9.34)   
ln(other services) *(ln(wage)-ln(other 
expenses)) –0.126*** (–8.14)   –0.0134   (–0.86)   –0.00528   (–0.43)    0.144*** (5.56)   
Control variables 
ln(equity/assets) –2.490*** (–22.49)   0.105   (0.90)   -0.0254   (-0.13)    0.795*** (5.19)   
(ln(eqauity/asset))² –0.371*** (–22.37)   0.0256   (1.45)   0.00136   (0.04)    0.163*** (4.96)   
Constant –0.00271   (–0.86)   –0.0657*** (–3.16)   0.000664  (0.02)    1.03e-13   (0.00)   
F 1760657.7   86663.1   18374.9    13849.3   
Adj-R2 0.9997 0.9998 0.9990 0.9987 
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Appendix D. Financial reform indices 
 
 
 
Financial reform indices Table D.1 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Financial liberalization 
index 0.179 0.226 0.298 0.345 0.345 0.345 0.393 0.393 0.488 0.488 
Interest rate 
liberalization index 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 
Source: Abiad et al. (2010), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/data/wp08266.zip. A value of 0 indicates a fully repressed 
financial system, while a value of 1 points at a fully liberalised one. Interest rate liberalization index, which takes values of 0, 1, 2 and 3, 
indicates respectively a fully repressed, partially repressed, partially liberalised and fully liberalised system.  
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Appendix E. Additional robustness tests 
 
In this section, we present a number of tests to check the robustness of our results for 
alternative specifications and estimation methods. The robustness checks show that 
alternative definitions of competition indicators do not change our results significantly. 
Specifically, we test in Appendix E whether the main results are sensitive to: 1) unscaled 
version of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic; 2) parametric approach of Panzar-Rosse; 3) 
alternative Lerner index (conjectural variation); 4) alternative definition of PE indicator; 5) 
calculation marginal costs.  
E.1.  UNSCALED PANZAR-ROSSE H-STATISTIC 
In our estimation of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic (Appendix A), we used the scaled approach, 
ie the logarithm of interest income to total assets as the dependent variable, in order to be 
able to compare our results with those of Yuan (2006) and Fu (2009). However, we know 
from the literature that this approach is biased. Bikker et al. (2007) and Bikker et al. (2012) 
demonstrate that taking interest income as a share of total assets as the dependent variable, 
instead of the absolute amount of interest income (unscaled version), overestimates the 
degree of competition. In addition, when using this specification, results indicating both a 
monopoly and a situation of perfect competition will be distorted. The inclusion of scale 
variables as explanatory variables in the revenue function has a similar distorting effect.  
As a sensitivity test, we estimate an unscaled version of the H-statistic using 
ln(interest income) as dependent variable.37 The results show even a more pronounced 
different pattern before and after China joined the WTO: The H-statistic indicate that Chinese 
loan markets were characterised by perfect competition before WTO accession and moved to 
monopolistic competition afterwards. Yuan (2006) and Fu (2009) reached similar conclusions, 
although with the scaled approach. Hence, the results of the theoretically better founded 
unscaled version of the Panzar-Rosse model show that Chinese loan markets were already in 
a state of perfect competition before further important financial reforms were implemented in 
the context of WTO accession in 2001 and that since then competition only declined. We 
hold the view that applying the more preferable unscaled version actually reinforces the 
shortcomings of the H-statistic for China.    
E.2.  PARAMETRIC APPROACH OF PANZAR-ROSSE 
Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) employed a parametric approach by incorporating time variant 
coefficients in the revenue equation, which allows for formally testing the evolution of bank 
competition over time. As a robustness test, we also estimated the H-statistic assuming a 
parametric structure of the evolution of competition, with the following specification: 
            
     
* *
1
2 3 4 5 1... 1
ln ln ln ln exp ln _
ln _ ln _ ln _ _
it it it it it it
h
it it it it h H h i it
II TA AFR PPE PCE t LNS TA
ONEA TA DPS F EQ TA OI II d error
     
     
    
      
 (E.2.1) 
where t is time, and the H-statistic is defined as Ht=(++)exp(ζ*t). With this 
specification, if ζ=0, the competitive structure is constant over time, while ζ>0 (ζ<0) indicates 
an increasing (decreasing) level of competitiveness over time. Estimation is carried out with 
nonlinear least square. Our results show a significantly negative time coefficient ζ of -0.0041 
                                                                          
37  Results are available upon request.  
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(p-value 0.0000), suggesting an annual decrease in the level of competition for the whole 
sample period. Wald F-tests on the sum of the input price elasticities reject the H-statistic 
being 1 (perfect competition) and 0 (monopoly) at a 1% significance level, indicating that all 
years could be characterised by monopolistic competition. Furthermore, a Wald F-test on the 
long-run equilibrium condition rejects E=0 at a 1% significance level for each year which 
suggests that Chinese loan markets were in disequilibrium. These results confirm that our 
results for the H-statistic are not sensitive to specific estimation methods. Results are 
available upon request.  
E.3.  ALTERNATIVE LERNER INDEX (CONJECTURAL VARIATION) 
In Section 6.1 we calculated the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index L by first estimating λ, ie the 
ratio of conjectural variation Θ to the elasticity of demand ε. Subsequently we could estimate 
L as λ/p, with p the average price of loans (average lending rate). An alternative approach is to 
estimate explicitly the conjectural variation Θ by simultaneously estimating the TCF (Equation 
4.2), the supply equation (Equation 4.6) and an inverse loan demand function. Then the 
conjectural variation parameter Θ can serve as a direct measure of competition. In a perfectly 
competitive market, Θi equals to zero for all i, while for a monopoly it equals to one. This 
approach is adopted in Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) for Japanese banking market. Following 
this approach, we find that the estimated inverse demand elasticity is very stable across all 
years, which implies that conjectural variation follows a similar pattern to the evolution of the 
elasticity-adjusted Lerner index. Subsample estimations show that the conjectural variation is 
0.068 and 0.087 for the pre-WTO respectively the post-WTO period, with the former being 
more competitive than the latter at a 1% significance level. We conclude that our main results 
obtained with the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index hold if conjectural variation is employed as a 
direct measure of competition. The full estimation process and results are not reported here 
to save space, but are available from the authors upon request.  
E.4.  ALTERNATIVE DEFINITION OF PE INDICATOR 
We calculated the PE indicator by using the logarithm of πilt or profits obtained from loans as 
the dependent variable (see Section 6.2). This is a more accurate measure of profits 
generated by loan business. Alternatively, as a robustness check, we follow Boone et al. 
(2004) and use the logarithm of variable profits as the dependent variable. This approach has 
the advantage that it avoids potential estimation errors, as variable profits can be obtained 
directly from accounting data. At the same time, it has the disadvantage that variable profits 
capture not only profits from loans but also those from other activities. Variable profits are 
defined here as the difference between total income and the sum of interest expenses and 
other non-interest expenses.38 We find that they are highly correlated with the definition of 
profits that we used in Section 6.2, with a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.9607.  
Similar to the other estimations, we estimate yearly and subsample PE indicators 
which are reported in Panels B of Table E.1 respectively E.2. Again, competition follows the 
same pattern that we reported for the initial results. The structural break test for the point 
estimates for the two subsamples again supports our finding that the pre-WTO period is less 
competitive than the post-WTO period. 
 
                                                                          
38. An alternative definition of variable profits is interest income - (interest expenses + other non-interest expenses). Our 
main conclusions are not sensitive to this alternative definition. Results are available upon request.  
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E.5.  CALCULATION OF MARGINAL COSTS 
For the (elasticity-adjusted) Lerner index, we assumed that the Translog Cost Function (TCF) 
for each bank group (SOCB, JSCB, CCB, FOREIGN) is the same, as only the constant term is 
allowed to vary across bank groups through bank type dummies (Equation 4.2). For the PE 
indicator, we improved the estimation by imposing different cost functions on different bank 
groups and estimated a separate TCF for each bank group. Both ways of treating cost 
functions for specific bank groups are generally accepted in the literature. Nevertheless, this 
difference could potentially generate different marginal costs. As for both the Lerner index and 
the PE indicator marginal cost estimations directly affect their values, it is important to test 
whether the contradictory results that we find could be driven by differences in the estimated 
marginal costs.   
To this end, we conduct the following two robustness tests. First, we re-estimate the 
(elasticity-adjusted) Lerner indices assuming different cost functions for each bank group. 
Second, we re-estimate the PE indicator using the marginal costs that we estimated for the 
elasticity-adjusted Lerner index (MCe), ie assuming similar translog cost functions for bank 
groups.  
When re-estimating the (elasticity-adjusted) Lerner indices, we use different TCFs for 
each bank group by allowing for bank type dummies to interact with the independent 
variables in the TCF. We calculate again yearly and subsample values, which are shown in 
Table E.3. The modification in the TCF turns out to change the elasticity-adjusted Lerner 
index only very marginally for both the yearly and subsample estimations39. Moreover, the 
traditional Lerner index also resembles closely our previous results. This confirms that our 
previous findings are robust to different calculations of marginal costs.  
The results for the re-estimation of the PE indicator using the marginal costs that we 
estimated in order to obtain the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index (MCe) are shown in Panel A of 
Table E.1 for the yearly results and of Table E.2 for the subsample results. The former follows 
a very similar pattern to our previous results. Moreover, also our conclusion that the pre-WTO 
period had much lower competition than the post-WTO era remains intact. 
                                                                          
39. Underlying estimations of elasticity-adjusted Lerner index not shown to save space. Results are available upon 
request.  
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Yearly estimates of alternative PE indicators Table E.1 
 
Panel A: Independent variable ln(MCe) 
Panel B: Dependent variable ln(variable 
profits) 
 PE 
Indicator z-value 
AP 
chi2(1)  
p-value 
AP  
F(1,440) 
PE 
Indicator z-value 
AP 
chi2(1)  
p-value 
AP 
F(1,442) 
1997 –2.314 (–1.53)    0.0000 18.08 6.656 (0.49) 0.4866 0.46 
1998 –1.769 (–1.00)    0.0101 6.27 -2.183 (-1.26)    0.1021 2.53 
1999 3.609 (1.3) 0.0000 33.08 -0.627 (-0.25)    0.0000 26.78 
2000 –1.379 (–0.44)    0.0127 5.88 -0.667 (-0.37)    0.0000 17.13 
2001 –5.748*** (–4.26)    0.0000 29.48 -3.086*** (-4.11)    0.0000 31.54 
2002 –6.826**  (–2.20)    0.0009 10.46 -3.594*** (-2.64)    0.0000 20.2 
2003 –3.754**  (–2.49)    0.0000 65.05 -4.391**  (-2.57)    0.0027 8.57 
2004 –3.810**  (–2.25)    0.0000 72.28 -2.937*** (-3.13)    0.0000 58.35 
2005 –1.605 (–1.41)    0.0000 95.18 -1.1 (-1.58)    0.0000 67.33 
2006 –4.633*** (–2.87)    0.0001 14.46 -3.090*** (-3.28)    0.0000 20.59 
2007 –3.669*** (–4.27)    0.0000 74.47 -3.264*** (-5.47)    0.0000 89.25 
2008 –3.584*** (–3.93)    0.001 10.27 -1.959*** (-3.26)    0.0000 28.18 
Constant –2.511 (–1.00)        1.983 (1.13)    
Nr. Obs 464 466 
F 4.649 4.685 
Centered R2 0.132 0.0961 
z-values in parenthesis; ** represent significance level of 5%, *** represent significance level of 1%; AP chi2 is the Angrist-Pischke (AP) 
first-stage chi-squared test: AP F is the  Angrist-Pischke (AP) F-statistics. Test statistic can be compared to Stock-Yogo (2002, 2005) 
critical values for Cragg-Donald F statistic with K1=1. The Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values at 10% maximal LIML size are 16.38. 
Year dummies are not reported here to save space. 
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Whole sample and subsample estimates of alternative PE indicators Table E.2 
 Panel A: Independent variable  ln eMC  
Panel B:Dependent variable: 
 ln  variable profits  
1996–2008 1996–2001 2002–2008 1996–2008 1996–2001 2002–2008 
PE Indicator –1.928*** –1.522 –3.717*** –2.023*** –1.487 –2.870*** 
  (–3.81)    (–1.01) (–5.65)    (–5.66) (–1.64) (–7.07)    
Time Trend –0.0142 –0.508* 0.367*** 0.0087 –0.461** 0.296*** 
  (–0.34)    (–1.67) (4.9) (0.24) (–2.20) (4.45) 
Constant 1.069 4.889 –8.492*** 0.516 4.540** –5.236*** 
  (0.73) (1.63) (–3.67)    (0.46) (2.34) (–3.37)    
H0:prewto –postwto<=0 
(p-value) 2.14* (0.071) 2.34* (0.063) 
Nr. Obs 464 91 373 466 91 375 
F 7.226 1.815 21.24 16.01 2.349 29.25 
Centered R2 0.0247 0.0495 0.104 0.0691 0.101 0.141 
K-P rk Wald F 336.7 77.97 163.2 227.9 34.97 142.4 
K-P rk LM (p-value) 73.24(0.00) 15(0.000) 50.52(0.000) 64.78 (0.000) 13.59 (0.000) 45.18 (0.000)  
z-values in parenthesis; * represents significance level of 10%, ** represent significance level of 5%, *** represent significance level of 1%. 
K-P rk Wald F is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic. K-P rk LM is Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic. The Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical 
values at 10% maximal LIML size are 16.38 
 
Lerner indices assuming different TCFs for each bank group Table E.3 
   t  
Elasticity 
adjusted Lerner 
index Lerner index eMC  lMC  
1997 0.077 0.458 0.330 0.080 0.104 
1998 0.048 0.410 0.317 0.080 0.079 
1999 0.030 0.294 0.244 0.062 0.066 
2000 0.022 0.221 0.284 0.055 0.055 
2001 0.020 0.237 0.228 0.051 0.055 
2002 0.016 0.223 0.292 0.044 0.042 
2003 0.017 0.240 0.298 0.046 0.045 
2004 0.020 0.287 0.311 0.047 0.045 
2005 0.023 0.288 0.330 0.051 0.050 
2006 0.026 0.332 0.349 0.052 0.051 
2007 0.036 0.457 0.417 0.047 0.047 
2008 0.040 0.426 0.410 0.059 0.056 
1996–2001  0.027 0.235 0.284 0.071 0.069 
2002–2008  0.026 0.335 0.355 0.051 0.049 
H0: Elasticity Adj Lerner prewto>=Elasticity Adj Lerner postwto : chi2(1)=7.93 p-value = 0.0024 
t
  are statistically different from zero for all year at a 1% significance level; 
e
MC  and 
l
MC  are average marginal cost estimated from 
elasticity-adjusted Lerner index and traditional Lerner index, respectively. 
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